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ABSTRACT 
For effective hazard mitigation planning and prompt-but-prudent responses, it is essential to 
evaluate the reliability of infrastructure networks accurately and efficiently and if needed, to 
make a reasonable decision under a budgetary constraint on retrofitting prioritization of 
vulnerable components. In general, however, network analysis is highly intricate in nature 
because of a large number of network components, complex network topology, statistical 
dependence between component failures, and network interdependency. Thus, network analysis 
is often performed by repeating computational simulations of network performance for random 
samples of hazard intensity measures and corresponding component status. This simulation-
based approach allows for straightforward applications of deterministic network analysis 
algorithms, yet hampers rapid risk assessment and effective decision-making. Even though a 
non-simulation based algorithm, termed as a recursive decomposition algorithm (RDA), was 
recently proposed to identify disjoint cut sets and link sets and to compute the network reliability 
based on the identified sets, it is not feasible for a large-sized network because of the exponential 
program nature. Besides these challenges, it is a more daunting task to conduct a decision-
making analysis on the network-retrofitting problem because of multiple conflicting decision-
making criteria, re-retrofitting effects, integer optimization for a large-size problem and others.  
This thesis proposes noble network analysis methods to efficiently compute the system 
reliability and make a reasonable decision on retrofitting prioritization of vulnerable components 
in the large-sized network. First of all, an efficient risk assessment framework for large-size 
networks is introduced with consideration of both inter-event and intra-event uncertainties in 
spatially correlated ground motions. Subsequently, two advanced analytical network reliability 
approaches are developed for the framework – the “selective” Recursive Decomposition 
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Algorithm (RDA) and the clustering-based multi-scale network reliability analysis. In calculating  
the probabilities of network disconnection events, the selective RDA achieves faster convergence 
of the bounds on the probabilities with a significantly reduced number of identified sets by 
identifying critical disjoint cut set and link sets preferentially by use of the most reliable path 
algorithm and a selective graph decomposition scheme. Besides, the clustering-based multi-scale 
network reliability approach overcomes the intrinsic limitation of the selective RDA that the 
computational cost may increase exponentially with the network size. The approach identifies an 
adequate number of clusters by use of spectral clustering algorithms and represents the clusters 
with representative super-links connecting inter-cluster nodes. If the simplified network is still 
exceedingly large to handle, additional levels of hierarchical clustering are introduced. By use of 
the proposed approach, any sizable problem can be solved without significant accuracy 
compromise. Lastly, a multi-scale multi-criteria decision making analysis approach is developed 
by incorporating the component-level multi-criteria utility theory and the network component 
importance measure to the aforementioned advanced analytical network reliability analysis 
approaches. Given an integer-based budgetary constraint and interaction of network components, 
the approach consists of a constraint binary integer optimization program and an iteration 
process to select a component to retrofit with preference while updating the CPIM component 
utilities based on the retrofit decisions. All of the proposed methods are applied to the 
hypothetical and/or real-world examples to demonstrate their accuracy and efficiency. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Motivation 
Today’s society strives for “hazard-resilience,” which is defined as a capability to reduce 
likelihood of failure, socio-economic consequence from failure, and time required for recovery 
(Bruneau et al. 2003). The hazard-resilience of a society depends critically on the post-disaster 
performance of urban lifeline networks that allows for telecommunication, transportation, and 
utility services such as electricity, water, sewage and gas. Therefore, it is essential to evaluate 
reliability of such networks efficiently and accurately.  
Besides, many urban lifeline networks had been built before proper structural codes were 
introduces, and have been deteriorating over time. For example, the American Society of Civil 
Engineers (ASCE) claimed in 2013 that the America’s infrastructure GPA is D plus and that 3.6 
trillion dollars should be invested to retrofit them all by 2020 (ASCE, 2013). It means that the 
current society faces a matter of choice and the retrofitting priorities should be set among the 
component structures in that the available budget is not enough to fix all the under-designed or 
deteriorated structures. Therefore, it is also needed to make a reasonable decision on retrofitting 
the vulnerable components by considering the retrofitting priorities under the budgetary 
constraint so that the society can exercise effective hazard-mitigation planning and “prompt-but-
prudent” post-disaster responses.  
1.2. Technical Challenges 
In general, however, network analysis is highly intricate in nature due to a large number of 
network components, complex network topology, network interdependency, and statistical 
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dependence between component failures, which is caused by so-called common source effects, 
e.g. spatially correlated ground motions. Thus, network analysis is often performed by repeated 
computational simulations of network connectivity or flow for randomly generated samples of 
hazard intensity measures and corresponding component status. This “simulation-based” 
approach allows for straightforward applications of deterministic network analysis algorithms to 
a wide class of lifeline network problems. However, the sampling nature of the approach may 
hamper rapid risk assessment, which is critical for developing near-real-time risk alert systems 
and for supporting prompt post-disaster decision-making. The approach may not be flexible 
enough to compute conditional probabilities given post-disaster observations or quantify relative 
importance of network components in terms of their contributions to system failure events. 
In addition, in the lifeline network problem, it is more complicated to determine which 
component should be retrofitted with preference. In nature, retrofitting decision making 
problems typically involve multiple conflicting criteria. For example, retrofitting costs usually 
rise to improve component reliability. Besides these criteria, decision makers should also 
simultaneously consider several other conflicting criteria such as retrofitting effects, traffic 
disruption by construction. Thus, decision makers are inevitably faced with trade-offs among the 
multiple conflicting criteria and need an efficient tool to handle the trade-off issues.  The 
complicated network topology makes a matter of choice even more complicated because the 
importance of a component varies with its relative location in the system network. In other words, 
the importance of one component may not be the same as the other component even if both of 
them have the same preferences from the component level perspective. On top of it, the 
retrofitting project of one component may affect the overall preference order. That is, even 
though a prioritization list is set, the prioritization list could be significantly changed after 
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conducting the retrofitting project for one component with higher preference. It is called a 
network level problem. 
 
1.3. Objectives and Organization 
For effective hazard mitigation planning and prompt-but-prudent responses, two objectives are 
set for this study as follows: Firstly, this study primarily aims at developing non-sampling-based, 
analytical system reliability methods by overcoming computational challenges in risk assessment 
of lifeline networks. Secondly, based on the developed techniques for efficient system reliability 
analyses, this study also focuses on developing the multi-criteria decision making method of 
lifeline networks to be able to set the retrofitting priorities of lifeline components to maximize 
the benefit from a constrained budget. 
Following this chapter, Chapter 2 introduces an efficient risk assessment framework for 
large-size lifeline networks with consideration of both inter-event and intra-event uncertainties in 
spatially correlated ground motions. The proposed risk assessment framework consists of the 
three main tasks: 1) component reliability analysis to compute the failure probabilities of 
network components, 2) system reliability analysis to evaluate disconnection component 
probabilities, and 3) calculation of component importance measures to quantify relative 
importance of network components. In each task, the statistical dependence between component 
failures caused by the spatial correlation of ground motion is taken into account. Subsequently, 
two advanced analytical network reliability approaches are proposed to use the proposed 
framework for real lifeline networks. Firstly, the “selective” Recursive Decomposition 
Algorithm (RDA) in Chapter 3 is a new analytical method developed for efficient risk 
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assessment of lifeline networks. The selective RDA achieves faster convergence of the bounds 
on network disconnection probabilities obtained by RDA by identifying critical disjoint cut sets 
and link sets preferentially by use of the most reliable path algorithm and a selective graph 
decomposition scheme. However, the selective RDA inherits the intrinsic limitation of the 
original RDA in that the computational cost may increase exponentially with the network size. 
Thus, a new multi-scale analysis approach in Chapter 4 is developed to facilitate risk assessment 
of large-size complex networks. The so-called clustering-based multi-scale approach is 
developed based on spectral clustering algorithms and the selective RDA in order to overcome 
computational challenges in risk assessment of large-size lifeline networks. The approach 
identifies an adequate number of clusters by use of spectral clustering algorithms and represents 
the clusters with representative super-links connecting inter-cluster nodes. By use of the selective 
RDA, the failure probabilities of the super-links and the statistical dependence between the 
failures of components and super-components are evaluated. If the simplified network consisting 
of these super components is still exceedingly large for the selective RDA to handle, additional 
levels of hierarchical clustering are introduced. The efficiency and effectiveness of the advanced 
network reliability assessment approaches in Chapters 3 and 4 are demonstrated by incorporating 
these approaches into the lifeline network risk assessment framework presented in Chapter 2. 
The above-mentioned chapters are dedicated to the first objective of this study. In order to fulfill 
the second objective of this study, a new network-level multi-scale multi-criteria decision 
making approach is developed in Chapter 5. The approach incorporates the component-level 
multi-criteria utility theory into the analytical network reliability methods of Chapters 4 and 5. 
The conflicting decision criteria such as vulnerability, retrofitting effects and retrofitting costs 
are considered in the multi-criteria utility function in the component level. The component-level 
5 
 
utilities are updated based on the consideration of the relative importance of the components with 
regard to the network performance. Finally, a summary of the major findings and suggestions for 
further study are presented in Chapter 6.    
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2. LIFELINE RISK ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK WITH CONSIDERATION OF 
SPATIALLY CORRELATED GROUND MOTIONS 
 
This thesis primarily aims at developing non-sampling based, analytical system reliability 
methods to overcome computational challenges in risk assessment of lifeline networks. This 
chapter first introduces an efficient risk assessment framework of large-size lifeline networks 
with consideration of both inter-event and intra-event uncertainties in spatially correlated ground 
motions. The goal of the framework presented in this chapter is later fulfilled by incorporating 
new advanced analytical network reliability approaches in Chapters 3 and 4 into the proposed 
framework. 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Ground motion intensities, caused by earthquakes, are typically expressed by a function that 
describes the attenuation of the ground motion intensities in terms of the parameters such as the 
earthquake magnitude, the distance between the earthquake source and the site. However, this 
attenuation relation is not deterministic, but has the uncertainties and spatial correlation of inter-
events and intra-events in the earthquakes (Goda and Hong 2008).  
Most lifeline networks consist of two components—links and nodes. Links are line-
shaped elements such as gas/water pipelines or power transmission and nodes are utility stations 
or important points interconnected by the links. Due to their spatial distribution over a large area, 
ground motion intensities may vary significantly over its length of links as well as at different 
sites. Adachi and Ellingwood (2007) and Song and Ok (2010) demonstrated that the failure 
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probability of a lifeline network is significantly affected by the spatial correlation of seismic 
intensities. Thus, the failure probabilities of links need to be obtained by system reliability 
analysis that can account for the statistical dependence.  Song and Ok (2010) proposed a multi-
scale network analysis approach, where a lower scale system reliability analysis is conducted 
with the discretized segments of links to get the failure probability of link components and the 
computed component failure probability is used for a network reliability analysis in the higher-
scale level. However, the study did not show the complete framework that can consider the inter-
event as well as intra-event uncertainties of the ground motion intensities. 
 
 
Figure 2.1     Multi-scale system reliability analysis framework of a lifeline network (Song and 
 Ok 2010) 
 
Thus, a risk assessment framework is hereby developed for lifeline networks under 
spatially correlated ground motions based on the multi-scale analysis scheme in Figure 2.1 
[Network System] 
Higher-scale System Reliability Analysis 
Station 
Fragility Models 
[Nodes] 
Lower-scale System Reliability Analysis 
[Links] 
[Segments] 
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proposed by Song and Ok (2010). The proposed risk assessment framework consists of the 
following main tasks: 1) component reliability analysis to compute the failure probabilities of 
network components as the lower scale system reliability analysis, 2) system reliability analysis 
to evaluate disconnection probabilities as the higher scale system reliability analysis, and 3) 
calculation of component importance measures to quantify relative importance of network 
components as a by-product of the network reliability analysis. The analysis framework is 
designed so as to employ the analytical system reliability approaches in Chapters 3 and 4 and in 
each task, the statistical dependence caused by the spatial correlation of ground motion is taken 
into account.  
 
2.2. Component Reliability Analysis 
In order to find the network reliability and failure probability through system reliability analysis, 
one needs to first perform component reliability analysis of node-type and line-type network 
components. The failure probabilities of such components are computed based on the 
uncertainties in the seismic demands and capacities of structural components. In this section, we 
consider 1) both the inter- and intra-event uncertainties in the seismic demands, 2) spatial 
correlation of the intra-event uncertainties, and 3) the uncertainties in the seismic capacity of the 
components based on the HAZUS fragility model (FEMA 2008).  The failure events of a node-
type component and a line-type component are assumed to be statistically independent of each 
other due to the dearth of models developed for spatial correlation between different seismic 
intensity measures used for node-type and line-type components.  
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2.2.1. Uncertainties of ground motion intensities and spatial correlation  
Goda & Hong (2008) provided a valuable insight on how to quantify the uncertainties in the 
seismic demands on the network components that show significant spatial correlation. Let us 
consider a typical attenuation relation for the ground-motion intensities,  
ln ( ) ( , , , ) η( ) ε ( )i n i i n n i nY T f M R T T T  λ                                         (2.1) 
where ( )i nY T  is a ground-motion intensity measure at the i-th site caused by an earthquake event, 
often determined in terms of the natural period Tn, e.g., spectral acceleration, ( , , , )i i nf M R Tλ  is a 
function that describes the attenuation of the ground motion intensity in terms of the earthquake 
magnitude M, the distance between the earthquake source and the site, Ri, and a set of other 
explanatory variables 
iλ ,η( )nT  is the inter-event residual with zero mean and standard deviation 
ησ ( )nT , and ε ( )i nT  is the intra-event residual with zero mean and standard deviation εσ ( ).nT  The 
inter-event residual η( )nT  at any particular period nT  is constant across all the sites while the 
intra-event residuals ε ( )i nT  at different locations are modeled as correlated random variables. It 
is often assumed that η( )nT  and ε ( )i nT  are statistically independent of each other and both 
follow normal distributions. 
In order to describe spatial correlation of intra-event uncertainties, Goda and Hong (2008) 
suggested the following correlation structure for ground motion intensity residuals. Consider the 
residuals at the i-th and j-th sites, separated by a distance ∆, denoted by ( ) η( ) ε ( )i i ii n n i nX T T T   
and ( ) η( ) ε ( )j j jj n n j nX T T T  respectively. Because η( )nT  and ε ( )i nT  are statistically independent 
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and have zero means, the correlation coefficient between the residuals, ρ ( , , )
i j
i j
X X n nT T  is then 
derived as 
η η ε ε
ηη ε ε
σ ( )σ ( ) σ ( )σ ( )
ρ ( , , ) ρ ( , ) ρ ( , , )
σ ( )σ ( ) σ ( )σ ( )i j i j
i j i j
n ni j i j i j n n
X X n n n n n ni j i j
X n X n X n X n
T T T T
T T T T T T
T T T T
            (2.2) 
where ηηρ ( , )
i j
n nT T  represents the correlation coefficient between η( )
i
nT and η( ),
j
nT  
ε ερ ( , , )i j
i j
n nT T  denotes the correlation coefficient between ε ( )
i
i nT  and ε ( ),
j
j nT  and σ ( )
i
X nT  is the 
standard deviation of ( ) η( ) ε ( ),i i ii n n i nX T T T   which is given by: 
2 2
η εσ ( ) [σ ( )] [σ ( )]
i i i
X n n nT T T  . It is noted from Eq. (2.1) that the correlation coefficient 
between ln ( )ii nY T  and ln ( )
j
j nY T , i.e., ln lnρ ( , , )i j
i j
Y Y n nT T  is the same as ρ ( , , )i j
i j
X X n nT T  in Eq. 
(2.2). 
In network component reliability analyses, peak ground acceleration (PGA) and peak 
ground velocity (PGV) are often used as ground motion intensity measures. For PGA or PGV, 
Eqs. (2.2) is no longer functions of the natural period 
nT  and thus ηηρ ( , )
i j
n nT T  becomes one. As a 
result, 
2 2
η ε
ln ln ε ε2 2
σ σ
ρ ( ) ρ ( ) ρ ( )
σ σi j i j i j
Y Y X X
X X
                                         (2.3) 
where 2 2 2η εσ σ σ .X    The standard deviations 
ησ  and ε
σ
 in Eq. (2.3) typically come along with 
the attenuation relation equations derived for the ground-motion intensities (Boore and Atkinson 
2008). In addition, for the intra-event spatial correlation ε ε
ρ ( ),
i j

 various spatial correlation 
models of ground-motion intensity residuals have been proposed to describe statistical 
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correlation between ground motion intensities at different locations based on recorded ground 
motion time histories (Goda and Hong 2008 Wang and Takada 2005, Jayaram and Jack 2009). 
In this study, both the inter- and intra-event uncertainties in Eq. (2.1) are considered in 
determining the seismic demand at a given location. Moreover, when the failure probability of a 
line-type element is computed based on the uncertain seismic demands and capacities at the 
segments of the line-type element, the correlation model described above is used to incorporate 
the statistical dependence between the segment failures. When the correlation is ignored, the 
segment failures are assumed to be statistically independent of each other, which may result in 
significant errors (Song and Ok 2010). 
2.2.2.  Reliability analysis of line-type components 
In this section, an efficient risk assessment framework is introduced for line-type components 
based on the multi-scale approach by Song and Ok (2010). In order to compute the failure 
probabilities of line-type components with proper consideration of spatially correlated seismic 
demands, a line-type component is discretized into small segments. When the segments are small 
enough, the failure within a segment can be assumed to follow a homogeneous Poisson process 
(Song & Ok 2010, Adachi and Ellingwood 2009). Suppose the pair of i-th and j-th line-type 
components is discretized to a total of ij
sn  segments in Figure 2.2. Then, the failure probability of 
the m-th segment is computed as:  
( ) 1 exp( ν )m m mP E l                                                       (2.4) 
where mE , νm and ml  respectively denote the failure event, the mean occurrence rate of the 
failure per unit length, and the length of the m-th segment. Using the HAZUS-MH mean 
occurrence rate model (FEMA 2008), νm  is determined as 
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( )m mk PGV
                                                                  (2.5) 
where k and γ are the model parameters, and PGVm is the peak ground velocity (PGV) at the 
midpoint of the m-th segment. 
 
 
Figure 2.2     Discretized segments of a pair of links 
 
The random variables PGVm, 1, ,
ij
sm n  are correlated with each other as explained 
above and expressed as 
ln ln mm mPGV PGV X                                               (2.6) 
where mPGV  denotes the attenuated PGV at the midpoint of the m-th segment (i.e., ln mPGV  
corresponds to ( , , , )i i nf M R Tλ  in Eq. (2.1)), and ( η ε )m mX    is a normal random variable that 
has a correlation model as explained above. By substituting Eqs. (2.5) and (2.6) into Eq. (2.4), 
the (predictive) failure probability of the m-th segment can be computed as 
 
 γ( ) 1 exp exp(γσ ) φ( )mm m X mP E kPGV u l u du


    
                      (2.7) 
Link i Link j
1
2
3
ij
sn
ij
sn -1
4
5
6
7
ij
sn -2
ij
sn -3
ij
sn -4
··
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where φ( ) is the probability density function (PDF) of the standard normal distribution, and σ
mX
 
is the standard deviation of the residual .mX  By use of the same procedure, the failure 
probability of the other segments in the pair can be calculated.   
In order to find the statistical dependence between the failures of two different segments, 
say, the m-th and n-th segments (note these segments could be located either in the same or the 
different pipelines), the joint failure probability of segments are computed as 
 
 
γ
γ
2
( ) 1 exp exp(γσ )
1 exp exp(γσ ) φ ( , ,ρ )
m
n m n
m n m X m m
n X n n m n X X m n
P E E k PGV u l
k PGV u l u u du du
 
 
     
  
   
  
 
               (2.8) 
where 
2φ ( , ,ρ )m nX X   denotes the bi-variate normal PDF with zero means, unit standard deviations 
and the correlation coefficient 
ρ
m nX X . The event of a segment failure, m
E
 can be described in 
terms of the standard normal random variable and reliability index, i.e., 
{ β }m m mE Z    where 
mZ  denotes the standard normal random variable representing the m-th segment, and 
1β [ ( )]m mP E
   is the reliability index of the segment, in which ( )   denotes the cumulative 
distribution function (CDF) of the standard normal distribution. The joint failure probability in 
Eq. (2.8) can be computed alternatively by a multi-normal probability calculation (Ditlevsen and 
Madsen 1996). 
ρ
2
0
( ) ( β β ) ( β ) ( β ) φ ( β , β ,ρ) ρ
Z Zm n
m n m m n n m n m nP E E P Z Z d                     (2.9) 
where ρ
m nZ Z
 is the correlation coefficient between 
mZ  and .nZ  This correlation coefficient 
describes the statistical dependence between the events 
mE  and ,nE  which is caused by the 
spatial correlation of seismic intensity measures. The calculations in Eqs. (2.7) and (2.8) provide 
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β ,m  βn  and  ( )m nP E E  in Eq. (2.9). Therefore, the correlation coefficient ρ m nZ Z  can be obtained 
by solving Eq. (2.9) numerically. The reliability indices of the segments and their correlation 
coefficients are then used for computing the failure probabilities of line-type components and for 
quantifying the statistical dependence between their failure events as explained below. 
First, the failure event of a line-type component is modeled as the union of the failure 
events of its segments. The failure event of the i-th line-type component, L
iE  is therefore given 
as 
i i
L
i m m
m S m S
E E E
 
                                                          (2.10) 
where 
iS  is the segment index set for the i-th line-type component. Then, the failure probability 
of the component is computed as 
( ) 1
i
L
i m
m S
P E P E

 
    
 
                                                        (2.11) 
The probability of the intersection event in Eq. (2.11) can be computed by use of a multi-variate 
normal probability algorithm. For example, the algorithm developed by Genz (1992) can 
compute high-dimensional multi-variate normal probabilities efficiently and accurately with the 
help of transformations in the random variable spaces and quasi Monte Carlo simulation 
techniques. This algorithm is used for the numerical examples in this thesis. 
Just as in Eq. (2.8) for a pair of segments, we need to compute the joint failure probability 
of a pair of line-type components as follows in order to find the correlation coefficient that 
describes the statistical dependence between the failures of line-type components. From the 
addition rule, the joint failure probability of two links can be computed as 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( )L L L L L Li j i j i jP E E P E P E P E E                                   (2.12) 
where ( )LiP E  and ( )
L
jP E  are computed by Eq. (2.11), and ( )
L L
i jP E E  is computed as follows. 
  1
i j i j
L L
i j m n m
m S n S m S S
P E E P E E P E
  
     
                   
                     (2.13) 
The probability of the intersection in Eq. (2.13) is computed by use of a multivariate normal 
probability calculation method based on the reliability indices and correlation coefficients of the 
segments. Now the joint failure probability of the line-type components can be considered as a 
bi-variate normal probability just as segment joint failures in Eq. (2.9), that is, 
ρ
2
0
( ) ( β β )
( β ) ( β ) φ ( β , β ,ρ) ρ
Z Zi j
L L
i j i i j j
i j i j
P E E P Z Z
d
    
       
                            (2.14) 
where βi  and β j  are the reliability indices computed as a result of the calculation in Eq. (2.11), 
that is, 1β [ ( )]Li iP E
   and
1β [ ( )],Lj jP E
   respectively. Substituting the joint failure 
probabilities computed by Eqs. (2.12) and (2.13) into Eq. (2.14) and solving the equation for 
ρ ,
i jZ Z  
one can find the correlation coefficient describing the statistical dependence between the 
failures of line-type components.  
 
2.2.3. Reliability analysis of node-type components 
One can assume that a node-type component in a network loses its connectivity when it exceeds 
a certain level of damage state. First, consider the conditional probability of the failure of a node-
type component given a PGA, i.e. the fragility function (Lim and Song 2012) 
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 ( | ) ln ln |
ln ln
                              
β
i
i i LS i i
i
LS
i
LS
P E PGA pga P PGA PGA PGA pga
pga PGA
   
 
  
 
                          
(2.15) 
where iE  denotes the failure of the i-th node-type component, iPGA  is the random peak ground 
acceleration (PGA) at the midpoint of the i-th component, 
i
LSPGA  is the uncertain limit-state 
capacity of the component (in PGA) following a lognormal distribution, and 
i
LSPGA  
and βiLS  are 
the median of 
i
LSPGA  and the standard deviation of ln ,
i
LSPGA  respectively. Considering the 
model ln lni i iPGA PGA X   where iPGA  is the attenuated PGA at the i-th component and 
η εi iX    is a zero-mean normal random variable with an auto-correlation model described as 
above representing inter- and intra-event residuals, the failure probability for a random PGA is 
derived as 
 
     
(2.16) 
 
 
where iU  is the standard normal random variable, and σX  is the standard deviation of the 
residual iX . Song and Ok (2010) assumed that the stations lose connectivity when they exceed 
“extensive” limit state. Thus, the probabilities of the node failures can be expressed as 
 
       
 
2 2
( ) ln ln
ln ln
β
ln ln
(β ) σ
i
i LS i
i
i LS
i i
LS
i
i LS
i
LS X
P E P PGA PGA
PGA PGA
P U
PGA PGA
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
  
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2 2
ln ln
( ) (  " ")
β σ
i extensiveN
i
extensive X
PGA PGA
P E P exceeds extensive
 
   
  
                     (2.17) 
The failure event of a node-type component can be described in terms of the standard normal 
random variable and reliability index, i.e., { β }Ni i iE Z    
where 
iZ  and βi  respectively denote 
the standard normal random variable representing the i-th node failure event and 
1β [ ( )]i iP E
   
is the reliability index of the node. 
Next, the joint failure probability of the i-th and j-th node-type components can be 
described as follows by extending Eq. (2.16):  
ln lnln ln
( )
β β
ji
j LSi LS
i j i ji j
LS LS
PGA PGAPGA PGA
P E E P U U
 
   
 
                  
(2.18) 
where iU  and jU  are uncorrelated standard normal random variables. Considering the spatial 
correlation between the residuals iX  and ,jX  i.e. ρ i jX X , the residuals can be alternatively 
described as 
( 1 )
( 1 )
i i j i j
j i j i j
i X X X i X X
j X X X j X X
X Y S
X Y S
  
  
  
  
                                              
(2.19) 
where iY , jY  and S  are uncorrelated standard normal random variables (Dunnett and Sobel 
1955). Substituting the residual model 
ln lni i iPGA PGA X   and Eq. (2.19) into Eq. (2.18), and 
considering the conditional independence of the node failures given ,S s  the joint failure 
probability is derived as a single-fold integral, i.e. 
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(2.20) 
 
The results of Eq. (2.20) and Eq. (2.16) are then substituted into Eq. (2.14) to compute the 
correlation coefficient representing the statistical dependence between the failures of node-type 
components. 
 
2.3.  System Reliability Analysis 
If the disjoint (or mutually exclusive) cut sets and link sets are identified, the probabilities of 
disconnection and connection are computed by summing up the probabilities of the identified 
disjoint cut sets and link sets, respectively. For example, if disjoint link sets, Li, i =1,…,NL are 
identified, the network reliability can be calculated by summing up the probabilities of the 
disjoint link sets, that is, 
1
( )
LN
i
i
R P L

                                                         (2.21) 
On the contrary, the network failure probability, or the probability of disconnection can be 
obtained by summing up the probabilities of disjoint cut sets Ci, i =1,…,NC, i.e.  
1
( )
CN
i
i
F P C

                                                        (2.22)       
 
                    
2 2
2 2
ln ρ ln
( )
(β ) σ (1 ρ )
ln ρ ln
                     φ( )
(β ) σ (1 ρ )
i i j
i i j
j i j
j i j
i
i X X X LS
i j
i
LS X X X
j
j X X X LS
j
LS X X X
PGA s PGA
P E E
PGA s PGA
s ds




  
   
  
 
  
  
  
 

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For a large-size network, it is often impractical to enumerate all disjoint cut sets and link sets. In 
such cases, one can obtain the upper and lower bounds by use of the identified disjoint cut sets 
and link sets, that is, 
, ,
, ,
1 1
1 1
( ) 1 ( )
( ) 1 ( )
L t C t
C t L t
n n
i i
i i
n n
i i
i i
P L R P C
P C F P L
 
 
  
  
 
 
                                                      (2.23) 
where ,L tn  and ,C tn  are the numbers of the identified disjoint link sets and cut sets, respectively.                                         
However, the number of link sets or cut sets is proportional with 2
n
 when n is the number 
of components of a network. Therefore, it is necessary to develop an approximate network 
algorithm to obtain narrow bounds on the failure probability efficiently. Recently, a Recursive 
Decomposition Algorithm (RDA) was developed as a non-simulation-based method for network 
reliability analysis (Li and He 2002, Li et al. 2007, Liu and Li 2009). For a pair of locations in a 
network, the algorithm identifies cut sets (i.e. joint failures of network components that cause the 
pair to be disconnected from each other) and link sets (i.e. joint survivals of components that 
ensure the connection of the pair) in a systematic manner. The RDA is known to be faster in 
identifying disjoint cut sets and link sets than other existing algorithms (Li and He 2002). 
However, it is noted that the original RDA suffers for a large-size network because the numbers 
of disjoint cut sets and link sets increase exponentially, which makes the identification process 
extremely time-consuming. Therefore, it is necessary to develop a network algorithm to obtain 
narrow bounds on the failure probability efficiently. In addition, there has been no research on 
how to incorporate the effect of spatial correlation in ground motions into RDA-based reliability 
analysis of large-size lifeline networks. 
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In the subsequent Chapters 3 and 4, advanced analytical approaches are introduced to 
overcome the computational challenges of the original RDA. The selective RDA of Chapter 3 
achieves faster convergence of the bounds on network probabilities of connection or 
disconnection by identifying critical disjoint cut sets and link sets with a priority by use of the 
most reliable path algorithm and a selective graph decomposition scheme. In Chapter 4, the 
efficiency is further improved by a clustering-based multi-scale approach, which identifies an 
adequate number of clusters in the network and computes the system reliability from the 
represented network, where the clusters are replaced with super-links based on the selective 
RDA. These advanced analytical techniques are incorporated to complete the efficient lifeline 
risk assessment framework. Since a link set or cut set is the intersection of the failure or survival 
events of the line-type and node-type components in the set, its probability is computed by a 
multi-variate normal probability algorithm based on the reliability indices and the correlation 
coefficients obtained by the procedures explained above (Genz 1992). If the survival event of a 
link or node appears in the identified cut set or link set, the sign of the corresponding reliability 
index is switched during the multi-variate normal probability calculations. When the correlation 
coefficient between the survival of one component and the failure of another component is 
needed, the sign of the correlation coefficient between the failure events of the same components 
is switched.  
 
2.4. Component Importance Measures 
In order to quantify the relative importance of components with regard to the system reliability, 
many component importance measures have been introduced and used in the system engineering 
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community (Fussell 1973, Vinod et al. 2003, Anders 1990). In particular, the conditional 
probability of a component’s failure given the system failure can be used as a component 
importance measure and was termed as conditional probability based importance measure (CPIM) 
(Song and Kang 2009). The CPIM of the i-th component is defined as 
( )
( )
( )
i sys
i i sys
sys
P E E
CPIM P E E
P E
                                                (2.24) 
where 
iE  is the failure event of the i-th component, and sysE  is the system failure event, e.g., the 
disconnection event between source and terminal nodes in a network. 
Both the system failure probability ( )sysP E  and the joint probability ( )i sysP E E  in Eq. 
(2.24) can be computed approximately using the identified disjoint cut sets and link sets. Because 
the cut sets ,jC  ,1,..., C tj n  identified by the selective RDA are disjoint to each other, ,i jE C  
,1,..., C tj n  are also mutually exclusive to one another. Therefore, the CPIM is approximately 
obtained as 
,
,
1
1
( )
( )
C t
C t
n
i j
j
i n
j
j
P E C
CPIM
P C





                                                       (2.25) 
This is a CPIM based on the identified disjoint cut sets. Alternatively, by using the identified 
disjoint link sets, the CPIM can be approximated as 
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, ,
,
1 1
1
1 ( ) ( ) ( )
1 ( )
1 ( )
1 ( )
L t L t
L t
n n
i j i j
i sys j j
i n
sys
j
j
P E P L P E L
P E E
CPIM
P E
P L
 

  

 


 

                  (2.26) 
The numerical examples in this thesis show that CPIM’s can be calculated with good accuracy 
with a relatively small number of identified cut sets and link sets if critical sets identified by the 
advanced analytical techniques such as the selective RDA and the clustering-based multi-scale 
approach are used. 
 
2.5. Summary  
An efficient risk assessment framework is developed using an analytical reliability approach to 
apply for large-sized lifeline networks with consideration of inter- and intra-event uncertainties 
in spatially correlated ground motions. Based on a multi-scale approach proposed by Song and 
Ok (2010), the failure probabilities of link components and their spatial correlation are computed 
in the lower reliability analysis level with the discretized segments and used for a network 
reliability analysis in the higher reliability analysis level using an analytical reliability approach. 
An important merit of an analytical approach is the ability to compute the CPIM to quantify the 
relative importance of components with regard to the system reliability. The systematic 
framework based on an analytical approach does not need the repeated computation, which is 
inevitable in the sampling-based approaches like MCS. Thus, the computational speed is 
improved and the application scope is widened. The details of advanced analytical network 
reliability approaches are explained in Chapters 3 and 4.   
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3. RISK ASSESSMENT OF LIFELINE NETWORKS USING SELECTIVE RECURSIVE 
DECOMPOSITION ALGORITHMS 
 
For effective hazard mitigation planning and prompt-but-prudent post-disaster responses, it is 
essential to evaluate the reliability of infrastructure networks accurately and efficiently. This 
chapter introduces a “selective” RDA, which preferentially identifies critical disjoint cut sets and 
link sets to calculate the probabilities of network disconnection events with a significantly 
reduced number of identified sets. 
 
3.1.  Introduction 
Various non-simulation-based methods have been developed to compute the probabilities of 
disconnection between two different locations in a network. This chapter focuses on improving 
such a non-simulation-based approach for efficient network reliability analysis regarding 
disconnection events caused by hazardous events. Kang et al. (2008) computed the probabilities 
of disconnection between a critical facility and urban areas by use of the Matrix-based System 
Reliability (MSR) method (Kang and Song 2008, Song and Kang 2009). The method allows for 
efficient evaluations of disconnection probabilities, parameter sensitivities of system failure 
probabilities, and importance measures of network components. However, to make use of the 
MSR method for network reliability analysis, one needs a special algorithm to identify the 
system failure event such as disconnection between two locations in terms of the failure events 
of network components, especially for networks with a large number of components and/or 
complex topology. 
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Recently, a Recursive Decomposition Algorithm (RDA) was developed as a non-
simulation-based method for network reliability analysis (Li and He 2002, Li et al. 2007, Liu and 
Li 2009). For a pair of locations in a network, the algorithm identifies cut sets (i.e. joint failures 
of network components that cause the pair to be disconnected from each other) and link sets (i.e. 
joint survivals of components that ensure the connection of the pair) in a systematic manner. In 
particular, disjoint cut sets and link sets are identified such that the probabilities of disconnection 
and connection are computed by summing up the probabilities of the identified disjoint cut sets 
and link sets, respectively. The RDA is known to be faster in identifying disjoint cut sets and link 
sets than other existing algorithms (Li and He 2002). 
Song and Ok (2010)  incorporated the RDA into a multi-scale network reliability analysis 
framework based on the use of the MSR method in order to calculate the probabilities of 
disconnection between the sources of utility resources and service areas under spatially 
correlated ground motions. However, it is noted that the original RDA suffers for a large-size 
network because the numbers of disjoint cut sets and link sets increase exponentially, which 
makes the identification process extremely time-consuming. Therefore, it is necessary to develop 
an approximate network algorithm to obtain narrow bounds on the failure probability efficiently. 
In addition, to the knowledge of the authors, there has been no research on how to incorporate 
the effect of spatial correlation in ground motions into RDA-based reliability analysis of large-
size lifeline networks.  
This chapter presents a new method, termed as a “selective” RDA, which is developed to 
identify critical disjoint cut sets and link sets that have dominant contributions to the likelihood 
of network connection or disconnection events. The probabilities of identified cut sets and link 
sets are then computed based on the fragilities of network components and the spatial correlation 
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of hazard intensities to obtain the lower and upper bounds of the network disconnection 
probability. The identified critical sets are used to quantify the relative contributions of network 
components to the network disconnection events via component importance measures. The 
selective RDA, based on the lifeline risk assessment framework of Chapter 2, are demonstrated 
by reliability analysis of a hypothetical network example, and the gas and water transmission 
networks of Shelby County in Tennessee, USA under an earthquake hazard scenario. 
   
3.2.  Review of Recursive Decomposition Algorithm 
Depending on how to decompose the network, a Recursive Decomposition Algorithm (RDA) 
can be categorized as a “path-based” or “cut-based” algorithm (Li and He 2002, Li et al. 2007).  
In this section, the path-based RDA will be reviewed in detail as follows and the “RDA” 
hereinafter will refer to the path-based RDA. A typical lifeline network consists of line-type 
components such as pipelines and electricity lines, and node-type components such as stations. 
Suppose these components have binary states, i.e., survival or failure after a hazardous event. As 
a result, two locations in the network can be disconnected from each other or remain connected. 
Using a graph theory, let us describe a lifeline network by a directed graph G = (N, A) where N 
and A respectively denote the sets of the nodes and arcs in the graph. Naturally, the 
abovementioned line-type and node-type components are modeled as arcs and nodes in a graph, 
respectively. In this section, we adopt a “node-weighted” approach, in which any component that 
has a likelihood of failure is modeled by a node in the graph. Thus, the node set N consists of the 
nodes representing node-type elements and the “link nodes” that are introduced to describe the 
status of line-type elements. One link node is assigned to a uni-directional line-type component 
while two link nodes are assigned to a bi-directional line-type component. The reliabilities of the 
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components are then considered as the weights of the corresponding nodes. The arc set A 
includes the arcs connecting the node-type and line-type elements to assure the given network 
topology. In this chapter, we develop the selective RDA based on the node-weighted approach, 
but the algorithm can be used for edge-weighted network models after a simple modification. 
The details of edge- and node-weighted approaches can be found in (Li and He 2002, Liu and Li 
2009, Ahuja et al. 1993). 
Let us consider a network consisting of a source node, a terminal node, other 
transmission nodes and arcs, which is represented by a graph G. (If one wishes to investigate the 
connectivity between two groups of nodes, a subjunctive node can be introduced to represent 
each group (Song & Ok 2010, Lee et al. 2011). Consider a “structure function” of the graph, i.e. 
( )G  which takes 1 if the source and terminal nodes are connected with each other and 0 
otherwise. Suppose all possible link sets between the terminal and source nodes, Si, i =1,…,NS  
have been identified by use of an algorithm. The network reliability or the probability of 
connection is then given as 
 
1
( ) 1
SN
i
i
R P G P S

 
     
 
                                                    (3.1) 
However, computing the network reliability by Eq. (3.1) is often challenging because it is not 
easy to identify all the link sets for a complex large-size network, and the statistical dependence 
between the link sets should be fully considered. If disjoint (or mutually exclusive) link sets, Li, i 
=1,…,NL are identified, the network reliability can be calculated by summing up the probabilities 
of the disjoint link sets, that is, 
 
1
( ) 1 ( )
LN
i
i
R P G P L

                                                    (3.2) 
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On the contrary, the network failure probability, or the probability of disconnection can be 
obtained by summing up the probabilities of disjoint cut sets Ci, i =1,…,NC, i.e.  
 
1
( ) 0 ( )
CN
i
i
F P G P C

                                                    (3.3) 
In order to obtain the disjoint link sets Li’s and disjoint cut sets Ci’s, the original RDA 
decomposes the graph and its sub-graphs based on the shortest paths between the source and 
terminal nodes identified by use of the Breadth First Search algorithm (Ahuja et al. 1993) 
without consideration of component reliability (see the section, “Component Reliability Analysis” 
in Chapter 2 for more details on how to evaluate component reliability). To describe the 
uncertain post-hazard connectivity of each identified shortest path, a Bernoulli random variable 
is introduced, i.e. a variable that takes “1” if the path is connected and “0” otherwise. Let 
ijA  
denote a Bernoulli random variable for the shortest path of the j-th sub-graph obtained during the 
i-th order graph decomposition. At the beginning of the decomposition process, the Bernoulli 
random variable for the shortest path of the first sub-graph identified from the original graph 
(zeroth order decomposition), i.e. 
01A  can be described as the product of the Bernoulli random 
variables representing the survival events of the nodes in the path, that is, 
0101 01,1 01,2 01,n
A a a a
 
in which 
01,ka , k=1,…,n01, denotes the Bernoulli random variable of the survival of the k-th node 
of the shortest path where n01 is the number of the nodes in the shortest path. 
The structure function ( )G  is then re-written as: 
01 01
0101
( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )
( )
G A G A G
A A G
     
  
                                                      (3.4) 
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where 01 011A A   represents the Bernoulli random variable for the complementary event of the 
shortest path survival. 
01 ( )A G  
and 
01A  always take the same value because the survival of the 
shortest path, 
01 1A  , is a subset of the event that the two nodes are connected, ( ) 1G  . 01A  is 
then expanded as: 
01
01 01
01
01 01,1 01,2 01,
01,1 01,1 01,2 01,1 01,2 01,3 01,1 01,2 01,( 1) 01,
01,1 01,1 01,2 01,1 01,2 01, 1 01, 01,1 01,2 01,
1
1 (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
( ) ( )
n
n n
i i n
A a a a
a a a a a a a a a a
a a a a a a a a a a


 
        
     
       (3.5) 
Substituting Eq. (5) into Eq. (4), the function ( )G  is decomposed as follows. 
 
01 01
01 01
01 01,1 01,1 01,2 01,1 01,2 01, 1 01,
01,1 01,2 01, 1 01,
01 01,1 11 01,1 01,2 12 01,1 01,2 01, 1 01, 1
01,1 01,2 01, 1 01,
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
i i
n n
i i i
n n
G A a G a a G a a a a G
a a a a G
A a G a a G a a a a G
a a a a




         
 
        

011
( )nG
          (3.6) 
where 1iG  represents the sub-graph of G, obtained by reflecting the event indicated in the set of 
the Bernoulli random variables associated with 
1( )iG  (denoted as “set coefficients” hereafter), 
i.e. 01,1 01,2 01, 1 01,i ia a a a . The set coefficients indicate the event that “nodes 1 to (i1) survive and 
node i fails.” Therefore, one can remove the i-th node from the graph and merge the other nodes 
into the source in sequence to obtain the sub-graph 1iG . This is to make the subsequent graph 
decomposition process more efficient by minimizing the number of entities handled by the 
shortest path search algorithm. Since the events corresponding to the terms in Eq. (3.5), i.e. 
“node 1 fails,” “node 1 survives but node 2 fails,” etc. are mutually exclusive to one another, all 
the events identified from the sub-graphs in Eq. (3.6) should be disjoint. 
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Now the intersection of the survival events of all the nodes in the shortest path 
(represented by 
01A ) is identified as the first disjoint link set 
01
1 01,1
n
kk
L e

 where 
,ij ke  denotes 
the event 
, 1ij ka  . If the source and terminal nodes in  in Eq. (3.6) turn out to be 
disconnected, the set coefficients associated with the disconnected sub-graph, i.e. 
 provides a disjoint cut set 1iC , which is described as 
1 01,1 01, 1 01,i i iC e e e  where 01,ie  is the complementary event of 01,ie . This is because the 
joint status of the nodes indicated by the set coefficients caused the source and terminal nodes to 
be disconnected. By contrast, if the terminal and source nodes in 
1iG  turn out to be connected, 
the sub-graph can be further decomposed into the second order sub-graphs by identifying the 
shortest path of 
1iG  and following the aforementioned procedure. Whenever the shortest path of 
a sub-graph is found, a new disjoint link set is identified. The disjoint link set should include not 
only the events of the nodes in the identified shortest path, but also all the set coefficients 
associated with all the lower-order graphs that lead to the current sub-graph. Such previous set 
coefficients should be included to the intersection for the disjoint cut sets as well. 
When all disjoint sets are identified by up to m-th order decomposition, the network 
reliability in Eq. (3.2) can be computed by 
,1 , 2 ,
01 1 1 2 2
1 1 1
1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
L L L m
L
n n n
j j j j mj mj
j j j
N
i
i
R P E P B E P B E P B E
P L
  

    

  

                 (3.7) 
1iG
01,1 01,2 01, 1 01,i ia a a a
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where ,ijE  i = 0,…,m, j = 1,…,nL,i is the event describing the survival of the j-th shortest path 
identified from the i-th order sub-graph, and ijB  is the intersection of all the events indicated in 
the set coefficients identified from the lower-order graphs. The disjoint link sets are therefore 
identified as 
1 01,L E 2 11 11,L B E …, , ,L L m L mN mn mnL B A  where ,11
m
L L ii
N n

  . On the other 
hand, the network failure probability in Eq. (3.3) can be computed by use of the disjoint cut sets 
as follows.  
,
1 1 1
( ) ( )
C i C
n Nm
ij i
i j i
F P D P C
  
                                                   (3.8) 
where ijD  , i = 0,…,m, j = 1,…,nC,i  is the intersection of all the events indicated in the set 
coefficients to obtain the j-th disconnected sub-graph among the i-th order sub-graphs. The 
disjoint cut sets are therefore identified as 
1 11,C D 2 12 ,C D …, ,C C mN mnC D  where 
,1
m
C C ii
N n

 . 
For a large-size network, it is often impractical to enumerate all disjoint cut sets and link 
sets. In such cases, one can obtain the upper and lower bounds by use of the identified disjoint 
cut sets and link sets, that is, 
, ,
, ,
1 1
1 1
( ) 1 ( )
( ) 1 ( )
L t C t
C t L t
n n
i i
i i
n n
i i
i i
P L R P C
P C F P L
 
 
  
  
 
 
                                                      (3.9) 
where ,L tn  and ,C tn  are the numbers of the identified disjoint link sets and cut sets, respectively. 
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3.3.  Selective Identification of Critical Disjoint Link Sets and Cut Sets 
For faster convergence of the bounds, it is desirable to identify critical cut sets and link sets, 
which have dominant contributions to the system failure probability and reliability. To this end, 
the original RDA is improved by 1) replacing the shortest path algorithm with an algorithm that 
identifies the most reliable paths, and 2) decomposing sub-graphs selectively based on the 
probabilities of the events indicated by the associated set coefficients. This “selective” RDA is 
explained as follows. 
First, we note from the aforementioned decomposition process of the RDA that the order 
of identifying disjoint cut sets and link sets (and thus the convergence of the bounds) depends 
highly on which path is identified from a given (sub-)graph for the decomposition. The original 
RDA identifies the shortest path by use of the Breadth First Search algorithm (Ahuja et al. 1993).  
During the identification process by the original RDA, the shortest path is defined as the path 
between the source and terminal nodes that has the minimum number of nodes. It is noted that 
the path with the minimum number of nodes may not lead to the link set that contributes most to 
the probability of connection necessarily. Therefore, one can speed up the convergence of the 
bounds by identifying the most reliable path, i.e. the path connecting the source and terminal 
nodes with the highest probability of survival. 
To this end, Dijkstra’s algorithm (Ahuja et al. 1993), an algorithm to find the path with 
the minimum distance, is modified to identify the most reliable path from a given node-weighted 
sub-graph. In the original network or sub-graph, the proposed algorithm divides the node set into 
two groups, S  (permanently labeled) and S  (temporarily labeled) at any intermediate step. 
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When the path reliability label r(i), i.e. a lower bound on the reliability of the most reliable path 
between the source and node i, is permanently determined, the node i is categorized as a 
permanently labeled node. The path reliability labels of the temporarily labeled nodes are 
updated in the forthcoming steps until they are permanently labeled. For illustration, consider a 
simple network example in Figure 3.1. As the first step (see Figure 3.1(a)), all path reliability 
labels r(i)’s are initialized as zeros and no node is yet permanently labeled. The permanently and 
temporarily labeled nodes are represented by shaded and hollow circles, respectively. Next, for 
the source node 1, r(1) is permanently labeled by the node reliability p(1) as shown in Figure 
3.1(b) because there is no possibility to further update the lower bound on the path reliability up 
to the current node. For the following steps shown in Figure 3.1(c)-(g), the path reliability 
between the source node and each of the adjacent nodes is computed by the product of 
reliabilities of the nodes in the path to find the temporary label node with the maximum path 
reliability. In Figure 3.1(c), for example, the node 2 is selected because the path 12 has the 
higher reliability than the path 13. During this process, the path reliability label r(i) is updated 
only when the newly calculated path reliability is higher than the previous label value. When all 
the incoming links are considered, the node is permanently labeled. 
The basic difference between the proposed “most reliable path” algorithm and the 
original Dijkstra’s Algorithm lies in the updating process. The most reliable path algorithm uses 
the path reliability label r(i)× p(j) where p(j) denotes the component reliability while the original 
Dijkstra’s Algorithm uses the distance label, r(i)+d(j) where d(j) denotes the distance between 
the adjacent nodes. When all the nodes belong to Group S, the algorithm stops the search. The 
most reliable path between the source and terminal nodes can be identified by tracing the 
predecessor indices (see Figure 3.1(h)).  
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                                                 (a)                                                                           (b) 
                 
                   (c)                                                                             (d)     
                       
                (e)                                                                                (f) 
                   
                                              (g)                                                                                 (h) 
Figure 3.1     Illustration of the most reliable path algorithm  
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Since the algorithm estimates the path reliability approximately by the product of 
component reliabilities, the path found by the algorithm is not guaranteed to be the most reliable 
one if the statistical dependence between network component failure events is significant. 
However, the path is still expected to be one of the most reliable paths, which helps the bounds 
converge quickly. The statistical dependence is fully considered when we compute the 
probabilities of the identified disjoint sets at the next step. 
Based on the first critical disjoint link set identified by the algorithm, the first order sub-
graphs are created as shown in Eq. (3.6). Now the question is which sub-graph should be first 
investigated in terms of their connectivity for fast convergence of the bounds. In the original 
RDA, the connectivity of the sub-graphs is investigated sequentially following the original 
component numbering choice. By contrast, the selective RDA checks the connectivity of the sub-
graph whose associated set coefficient shows the highest probability. In Eq. (3.6), for example, 
the probabilities of the events represented by
01,1 01,1 01,2 01,1 01,2 01, 1 01,, , , , ,i ia a a a a a a and 
0101,1 01,2 01,n
a a a are compared with each other to choose the sub-graph whose set coefficient has 
the highest probability. If the source and terminal nodes are disconnected in the selected sub-
graph, the associated set coefficient will lead to the first critical cut set. If the source and terminal 
nodes are connected, the most reliable path in the selected sub-graph is identified for further 
decomposition. Next, following the same scheme, the probabilities of the events represented by 
the set coefficients in all the first and second order sub-graphs are compared and the sub-graph 
whose set coefficient indicates the highest probability is selected for next decomposition.  
As a result, disjoint cut sets are identified in the descending order of the probabilities 
unless the effect of the statistical dependence between component failures make difference in the 
order of their probabilities. By contrast, the disjoint link sets are not identified in the descending 
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order of their probabilities in the strict sense. However, the probabilities of the identified link 
sets will show an overall descending trend because of the indirect influence of selecting the sub-
graphs associated with the set coefficients indicating the most probable event. This selection 
scheme, along with the use of the most reliable path algorithm, makes the bounds converge faster 
than the original RDA (see the flow chart in Figure 3.2). 
 
 
Figure 3.2     Flowchart of selective RDA (Flower: the lower bound on the failure probability,  
                         Fupper: the upper bound on the failure probability, P(Li): the probability of the  
                         identified link set, P(Ci): the probability of the identified cut set, and : the 
                         tolerance value on the gap of the bounds) 
 
 
 
 
 Original Network 
Flower=0, Fupper=1 
Decompose the most reliable path 
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      No 
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3.4.  Numerical Examples 
In order to test and demonstrate the selective RDA and the network risk assessment framework, a 
hypothetical network example and gas and water distribution networks in Shelby County, 
Tennessee are considered. The probability of disconnection will be computed by use of the 
original and selective RDAs to examine the improved efficiency of the selective RDA. 
Parametric studies are performed to investigate the component-numbering dependency and 
sensitivity with respect to component reliability. The conditional probability based importance 
measures are also computed by use of the selective RDA. 
 
 Figure 3.3     Hypothetical network example and assigned node numbers 
 
First, the hypothetical network example in Figure 3 has 20 node-type components and 36 
bi-directional line-type components. Following the node-weighted approach, two virtual link 
nodes are introduced to each line-type component. The total number of the nodes in the graph is 
thus 92. Among the two link node numbers assigned to each line in Figure 3.3, the smaller one 
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represents the direction from the node-type component with the smaller node number to that with 
the larger node number. The system reliability analysis in this numerical example aims at finding 
the probability that the station located at node 20 is disconnected from the station at node 1 after 
the earthquake scenario event. 
 
 
Figure 3.4     Simplified gas transmission network in Shelby County, TN (Modified from Song  
and Ok (2010)) 
 
The gas network has 17 node-type components and 20 uni-directional line-type 
components (37 total nodes). Figure 4 shows a simplified model of the gas transmission network 
of Shelby County, TN, which is a modified version of the network in Song and Ok (2010). A 
subjunctive source node (node 17) is added to combine three gas stations as one virtual source 
node, which transforms the problem to a single input node problem. The probability that the 
station located at node 5 is disconnected from the subjunctive source node 17 is computed by the 
proposed method. 
Figure 3.5 shows a simplified model of the water distribution network in Shelby County, 
TN, which consists of 50 node-type components and 78 line-type components (128 total nodes). 
A subjunctive source node (▲, node 50) is added to combine six real source nodes, i.e., elevated 
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storage tanks () to one virtual source node. The water flow direction in the pipeline was 
assumed based on the locations of storage tanks and pumping stations considering the fact that 
water flows from water tanks to distribution nodes and pumping stations help the flow. The 
network reliability analysis in this example aims at finding the probability that node 28 is 
disconnected from the subjunctive source node 50 after the scenario earthquake event. 
 
 
Figure 3.5     Simplified water distribution network in Shelby County, TN (Modified from Kim  
et al. (2009)) 
 
An earthquake scenario with a moment magnitude wM of 7.7 and the epicenter located at 
N35.3º and W90.3º is considered for all three examples. This is a dominant earthquake scenario 
with a seismic hazard of 2% in 50 years in this area, which was determined by a dis-aggregation 
analysis (Adachi and Ellingwood 2008). The local site effect is not considered in the calculation 
of seismic intensity. To compute the failure probabilities of the stations and pipelines, the PGV 
attenuation relation in (Wang and Takada 2005) is used, i.e.,  
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0.653
10 10log 0.725 0.00318 1.918log ( 0.334 ) 0.519
jM
jPGV M H D e               (3.10) 
where PGV  is given in cm/s, 
jM  is a Japanese Meteorological Agency (JMA) magnitude, H is 
the source depth in km, and D is the minimum distance between the fault plane and the site given 
in km. The standard deviations of the natural logarithms of inter- and intra-uncertainty residuals 
were proposed to be 0.37 and 0.51 respectively along with the attenuation relation (Annaka et al. 
1997). The corresponding value of 
jM  is approximately 7.5 for the magnitude 7.7wM   in the 
earthquake scenario (Elnashai and Di Sarno 2008). The depth H is assumed to be 10 km. A 
spatial correlation model was proposed based on the attenuation relation in Eq. (3.10) and Chi-
Chi earthquake records (Wang and Takata 2005) as 
lnεlnερ 1 exp( / 27.8)  
 
where   is the 
separation distance between two locations of interest given in km. 
For PGA, the example uses the spatial correlation model based on the same Chi-Chi 
earthquake records (Goda & Hong 2008) and the attenuation relation in (Boore & Atkinson, 
2008),  i.e. 
30ln ( ) ( , ) ( , , )M w D JB w S S JB wPGA F M F R M F V R M                               (3.11) 
where ,MF DF  and SF  represent the magnitude scaling, distance function, and site amplification, 
respectively,  
wM  is the moment magnitude, JBR  is the closest distance to the surface projection 
of the fault, and the velocity 
30SV  is the inverse of the average shear-wave slowness from the 
surface to a depth of 30m. In this chapter, an unspecified fault earthquake with a shear velocity 
30V  of more than the reference velocity (=760 m/s) was assumed. The attenuation relation can be 
expressed as 
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   
 
2 2
2 2
ln 0.53804 0.66050 0.11970( 4.5) ln 1.35
0.01151 1.35 1.0
w JB
JB
PGA M R
R
      
  
             (3.12) 
 
The standard deviations of the natural logarithms for inter- and intra-event uncertainties are 
assumed to be 0.265 and 0.502, respectively along with the attenuation relation. The proposed 
spatial correlation model is 0.40lnεlnερ 1 exp( 0.27 ).    .
 
Strictly speaking, the use of the spatial correlation models mentioned above should be 
limited to the particular area where these models were originally developed. However, due to the 
lack of such correlation models developed for Shelby County area, this chapter adopts these 
models in order to demonstrate the proposed framework of risk assessment of lifeline networks 
under spatially correlated ground motions with inter- and intra-event uncertainties considered. 
Seismic fragility models in the HAZUS-MH (2008) are used for the examples. HAZUS-
MH uses the PGV based mean occurrence model in Eq. (2.5) with 0.0001k   and γ 2.25  for 
brittle pipelines (asbestos cement, concrete and cast iron pipes). For ductile pipelines (steel, 
ductile iron and PVC), the mean occurrence rate is reduced to 30%. In this chapter, it is assumed 
that all of the pipelines are brittle and no liquefaction happens. For stations, all fragility models 
in HAZUS-MH use the log-normal distribution-based model in Eq. (2.15) and use five damage 
states (none, slight, moderate, extensive and complete). It is assumed that stations will lose their 
function and connectivity when it is either ‘extensive’ or ‘complete’ damage states, i.e. when it 
exceeds the ‘extensive’ limit state. The parameters for the stations fragilities in Eq. (2.15) are 
assumed to be 0.77 for the median PGA, PGAextensive (g) and 0.65 for the standard deviation of 
the natural logarithm, extensive, which are the HAZUS-MH fragility model for compressor 
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stations. For the gas network, the station fragility parameters above are used for gate station and 
regular station (Song and Ok 2010, FEMA 2008) while the other nodes are assumed to be 
undamaged as the distribution nodes. For the water network, the fragility models of the water 
storage tanks (above-ground steel), the median PGA, i.e. PGAextensive (g) is assumed to be 1.15, 
and the standard deviation of the natural logarithm, i.e. extensive is 0.6. For the pumping stations 
(medium/large plants with anchored subcomponents), we assume 0.77 for PGAextensive (g), and 
0.65 for extensive. The distribution nodes are assumed to be undamaged. 
3.4.1.  Results for Hypothetical Network Example 
Figure 3.6 compares the bounds on the disconnection probability obtained by Eq. (3.9) based on 
the disjoint cut sets and link sets identified by the original and selective RDAs. The bounds are 
plotted until the gaps approach 1%. The updates on the bounds are presented in terms of the total 
number of disjoint link and cut sets identified by the algorithms (Figure 3.6a) and the 
computational time costs (Figure 3.6b). The computational time costs reported hereinafter are 
based on using Matlab®  on a personal computer with Athlon 64X2 Dual Core Processor 5000+ 
2.61GHz CPU and 2GB RAM. Given that the total number of the identifiable disjoint sets is 
58,354 and the corresponding computational time is about 16,286 seconds, the compromise of 1% 
bound width is shown to be fairly efficient in both RDA approaches. However, Figure 3.6 clearly 
shows that the bounds by the selective RDA converge extremely faster than those by the original 
RDA. Specifically, the numbers of the total identified sets needed by the selective RDA to 
achieve the bound widths of 1% and 5% are only about 1/37 and  1/23 of those by the original 
RDA while the needed computational times are only about 1/42 and 1/22 of those by the original 
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RDA, respectively. It is also noted that the upper bounds, which are obtained by the identified 
link sets, converge faster than the lower bounds updated by the identified cut sets. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6     The bounds on the probability of disconnection for the hypothetical network  
example, obtained by the original and selective RDAs in terms of (a) number of 
identified disjoint sets, and (b) computational time 
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Table 3.1   Impact of component numbering choices on RDA performance 
RDA Type Original RDA Selective RDA 
Component 
Numbering 
(1) 
Shown 
(2) 
Ascending 
(3) 
Descending 
(1) 
Shown 
(2) 
Ascending 
(3) 
Descending 
# of link sets 3,399 811 1,074 113 113 113 
# of cut sets 4,230 1,252 1,421 93 92 90 
Time (sec) 2,366 504 562 58 60 60 
 
A parametric study is performed to investigate the impact of the component numbering 
choice on the efficiency of the RDA approaches. Table 3.1 shows the number of disjoint sets and 
the computational times required by the original and selective RDAs to achieve a bound width of 
1%. Three numbering choices are used: (1) “Shown”: the components are numbered as shown in 
Figure 3.3; (2) “Ascending”: the components are numbered in the ascending order of component 
reliability; and (3) “Descending”: the components are numbered in the descending order of 
component reliability. It is noted that the efficiency of the original RDA is significantly 
influenced by component numbering choice. For example, the original RDA is about 4.5 times 
faster when the component was numbered in the ascending order of component reliability than 
the original numbering choice shown in Figure 3.3. This is because the original RDA relies on 
the component numbering choice to determine which sub-graph will be decomposed next. Thus, 
it is rather unpredictable which numbering choice would allow for the best performance of the 
original RDA. By contrast, the performance of the selective RDA does not show any noticeable 
change and is superior to the original RDA in all numbering choices. This is because the 
decomposition by the selective RDA depends on the probabilities of sub-graphs and links, not on 
their numbering choices. 
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Figure 3.7     (a) Number of total disjoint link and cut sets identified for the hypothetical network 
example, and (b) computational time required by the RDA approaches to achieve 1% 
bound width for a range of earthquake magnitude 
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disjoint link and cut sets identified to achieve the 1% bound width. Figure 3.7(b) shows the 
computational time to achieve the same bound width. For the whole range of the earthquake 
magnitudes, the selective RDA is exceedingly more efficient than the original RDA for the 
whole range of earthquake scenarios. Both approaches require identifying only a small number 
of sets if most components in the network are highly reliable (as observed in (Lui and Li 2009)) 
or highly vulnerable. In such cases, the probabilities of cut sets or link sets show little variability, 
which makes the difference between the probabilities of critical sets (identified by the selective 
RDA) and non-critical sets (identified by the original RDA) insignificant. It is noted that the 
efficiency of the selective RDA is much less sensitive to the level of component reliability 
because the algorithm identifies the critical sets making the most dominant contribution 
regardless of the reliability level.  
Next, the impact of the spatial correlation of the ground motion intensity on the 
probability of disconnection is investigated. Figure 3.8(a) shows the average of the lower and 
upper bounds on the probability of disconnection between nodes 1 and 20 (the 1% bound width). 
The plot shows the results in two different cases: (1) “Correlated”: the spatial correlation 
between components is fully considered as explained above; and (2) “Independent”: the spatial 
correlation between components is ignored. In this example, if the correlation is ignored, the 
probability of disconnection is significantly overestimated for high magnitude earthquakes while 
it is slightly underestimated for low magnitude earthquakes. The overall overestimation is due to 
the fact that the disconnection of a link is the union of segment failure events as shown in Eq. 
(2.10). It is noted that the probability of the union of events is overestimated when their (positive) 
statistical dependence is ignored. In general, however, it is difficult to predict whether the 
assumption of statistical independence would over- or under-estimate the probability of 
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disconnection. Therefore, the spatial correlation needs to be considered carefully during network 
reliability analysis. 
 
 
Figure 3.8     (a) Probability of disconnection between nodes 1 and 20 in the hypothetical  
network example for a range of earthquake magnitude, and (b) probability of 
disconnection between node 1 and each station node for the earthquake scenario 
Mw = 7.7  
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Figure 3.8(b) shows the probabilities of disconnection between node 1 and each station 
node for the earthquake scenario of magnitude of 7.7. The station nodes from 6 to 20 are 
experiencing over-estimation in the probability of disconnection when spatial correlation is 
ignored. By contrast, the probabilities of disconnection are slightly underestimated for nodes 2, 4 
and 5 because of the independence assumption. It is noted that nodes 2 to 5 are directly 
connected to node 1, which indicates that the influence of the spatial correlation depends on the 
network topology and the node locations. 
3.4.2.  Results for Gas Transmission Network in Shelby County 
Figure 3.9 compares the bounds on the disconnection probability for the gas transmission 
network example. It is clearly shown that the bounds by the selective RDA converge much faster 
than those by the original RDA. Specifically, the numbers of the total identified sets needed by 
the selective RDA to achieve the bound widths of 1% and 5% are only about 31% and 7% of 
those by the original RDA. Since this is a small-sized network, it took only about 6 to 8 sec to 
identify all the disjoint cut set and link sets for both RDA approaches, and thus it may seem that 
the efficiency improvement by the selective RDA is not significant. However, the improvement 
in the computational efficiency will become clearer as the size of the network increases, which 
will be further investigated by the water distribution network later in this chapter.  
Figure 3.10 shows the probabilities of disconnection between node 17 and each station 
node for the earthquake scenario of the magnitude 7.7. The probabilities for all station nodes 
except for 1, 2 and 3 are significantly overestimated when the spatial correlation is ignored. By 
contrast, the independence assumption does not make any impact on station nodes 1, 2 and 3. 
This is because these nodes are directly connected with node 17.  
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Figure 3.9     The bounds on the probability of disconnection for the gas network, obtained by the  
original and selective RDAs in terms of (a) number of identified disjoint sets, and 
(b) computational time 
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Figure 3.10   Probability of disconnection between node 17 and each station node in the gas 
 network for the earthquake scenario Mw = 7.7 
 
The CPIM’s of the stations and pipelines with regard to the disconnection event of node 5 
are computed by Eq. (2.19) (“cut-set-based” CPIM) and by Eq. (2.20) (“link-set-based” CPIM) 
for bound ranges of 1%, 5% and 20%. Table 2 shows that failures of the pipelines contribute 
more to the likelihood of disconnection than stations. The asterisk mark (*) indicates that the 
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CPIM’s converge faster. These results imply that fewer critical sets are needed for providing 
reasonable estimates on component importance than for computing disconnection probabilities. 
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Table 3.2   The five largest CPIMs for stations and pipelines with regard to the disconnection  
event of node 5 
Node IDs 
True 
CPIMs 
Cut-set based CPIMs Link-set based CPIMs 
Bound widths Bound widths 
1% 5% 20% 1% 5% 20% 
Stations 
5 0.0510 0.0419 0.0261 0.0262 0.0511 0.0508 0.0501 
1 0.0261 0.0212 0.0102 0.0120 0.0261 0.0265 0.0263 
6 0.0215 0.0154 0.0039 0.0031 0.0214 0.0241 0.0241 
Pipe-lines 
30 0.9693 0.9748 0.9811 *0.9749 0.9688 0.9646 0.9642 
25 0.9651 0.9665 0.9793 *0.9864 0.9643 0.9621 0.9605 
19 0.9379 0.9399 0.9511 0.9432 0.9377 0.9358 0.9346 
 
3.4.3.  Results for Water Distribution Network in Shelby County 
Figure 3.11 shows that the lower and upper bounds by the selective RDA converge exceedingly 
faster than those by the original RDA in this network example as well. The bounds are plotted 
until the gap approaches 1%. The total number of the identified sets needed for the selective 
RDA to achieve the bound width of 1% is only about 1/273 of that needed for the original RDA. 
The computation time required for the selective RDA is only about 1/155. Comparison with the 
results of the previous example shows that the superior efficiency of the selective RDA becomes 
more conspicuous as the size of the network increases.  
Figure 3.12 shows the average of the lower and upper bounds on the probability of 
disconnection between node 50 and each station node for the earthquake scenario of the 
magnitude 7.7. When the spatial correlation is ignored, the disconnection probabilities are over-
estimated for all station nodes except for 1 to 6, which are directly connected with node 50. 
Table 3.3 shows the stations and pipelines with the highest CPIM values with regard to the 
disconnection event of node 28 (the bound width of 1%). The results show that the cut-set-based 
CPIM’s by Eq. (2.19) and the link-set-based CPIM’s by Eq. (2.20) give almost the same 
conclusion about the relative importance of the components. It is also shown that the failures of 
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pipelines contribute much more to the likelihood of the disconnection than stations in this 
example. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.11   The bounds on the probability of disconnection for the water network given in  
terms of (a) number of identified disjoint sets (linear scale), (b) computational 
time (linear scale), (c) number of identified disjoint sets (logarithmic scale), and 
(d) computational time (logarithmic scale) 
 
Figure 3.12   Probability of disconnection between node 50 and each station node of the water  
network for the earthquake scenario Mw = 7.7 
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Table 3.3   Stations and pipelines with the highest CPIM values with regard to  
the disconnection event of node 28 
Node IDs Cut-set based CPIMs Link-set based CPIMs 
Stations 
9 0.0351 0.0369 
11 0.0351 0.0363 
12 0.0299 0.0313 
14 0.0273 0.0279 
10 0.0218 0.0236 
Pipelines 
109 0.8547 0.8539 
68 0.8477 0.8452 
67 0.8212 0.8205 
78 0.8158 0.8143 
84 0.8136 0.8124 
 
 
3.5.  Summary  
In this chapter, a selective recursive decomposition algorithm (RDA) is developed to achieve 
faster convergence of the bounds on network disconnection probabilities obtained by RDA. For 
this purpose, the proposed algorithm identifies critical disjoint cut sets and link sets preferentially 
by use of the most reliable path algorithm and a selective graph decomposition scheme. Based on 
the risk assessment framework of Chapter 2, the selective RDA is tested and demonstrated by 
seismic reliability analyses of a hypothetical network, and the gas and water transmission 
networks of Shelby County in Tennessee, USA. 
In all three network examples, the proposed selective RDA allows for convergence of the 
bounds with a significantly fewer number of identified disjoint sets and reduced computational 
time cost. The improvement in the computational efficiency becomes more conspicuous as the 
network size increases because the computational costs of RDA approaches tend to increase 
exponentially with the number of network components. It is shown that the computational 
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efficiency of the selective RDA is not influenced by component numbering choice while the 
impact on the efficiency of the original RDA is significant and unpredictable. 
A parametric study is performed to investigate the impact of the spatial correlation of the 
ground motion intensity on the disconnection probability. The impact of spatial correlation 
depends on the earthquake magnitude and the network topology, which is hard to predict. 
Therefore, it is important to account for the spatial correlation in seismic reliability analysis of 
lifeline networks. 
The critical sets identified by the selective RDA can be used to compute component 
importance measures to quantify the relative importance of network components with regard to 
the likelihood of the network disconnection event. In the gas and water network examples, the 
failures of the pipelines show dominant contribution compared to stations. It is also noted that 
the conditional probability based importance measures (CPIM’s) obtained by the proposed 
approach are not sensitive to the level of convergence. Thus, a fewer number of sets are needed 
to provide reasonable estimates on component importance measures than needed for computing 
disconnection probabilities. 
The selective RDA improves efficiency of risk assessment of complex lifeline networks 
characterized by a large number of components, complex network topology, and statistical 
dependence between network component failures, which is essential for rapid disaster response 
and recovery operations as well as effective hazard mitigation planning. 
 
  
54 
 
4. RISK ASSESSMENT OF LIFELINE NETWORKS USING CLUSTERING-BASED 
MULTI-SCALE APPROACH 
 
The selective RDA provides efficient and accurate means for assessing the reliability of larger-
size lifeline networks. However, the selective RDA inherits the intrinsic limitation of the original 
RDA in that the computational cost may increase exponentially with the network size. In this 
chapter, a new clustering-based multi-scale approach is introduced to overcome the 
computational challenges of the selective RDA in risk assessment of larger-size lifeline networks. 
 
4.1. Introduction 
In order to facilitate the applications of the RDA approach to larger-size networks, a “selective” 
RDA is developed in Chapter 3, which identifies critical disjoint cut sets and link sets 
preferentially in order to calculate the probabilities of network disconnection events with a 
significantly reduced number of identified sets, and also proposed an efficient risk assessment 
framework based on the selective RDA. This selective RDA based framework provides efficient 
and accurate means for assessing the reliability of larger-size lifeline networks with 
consideration of both inter-event and intra-event correlation of ground motion intensities (Goda 
and Hong 2008, Jayaram and Baker 2009). However, the selective RDA inherits the intrinsic 
limitation of the original RDA in that the computational cost may increase exponentially with the 
network size. In other words, even though the selective RDA is still much more efficient than the 
original RDA, as the number of components in a network exceeds a certain level, the 
computational cost rapidly increases and may prevent rapid risk assessment. Considering the fact 
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that urban infrastructure systems tend to have high complexity and large size, more efficient 
network reliability analysis methods need to be developed. 
Multi-scale analysis approaches have been explored to facilitate the application of non-
simulation-based methods to larger-size networks (Der Kiureghian and Song 2008, Song and Ok 
2010). This approach groups adjacent structural components in a network and replaces them with 
super-components. System reliability analyses are then performed to compute the failure 
probability of the super-components and quantify their statistical dependence. For the simplified 
network consisting of the super-components, a system reliability analysis is then performed to 
compute the network reliability. This approach may reduce the sizes of the network problems 
significantly to make the non-simulation-based method computationally affordable. For 
maximum benefit of the multi-scale approach, however, a systematic procedure is desirable to 
identify components that will be consolidated based on the network topology instead of manual 
and/or arbitrary selections. 
Gómez et al. (2013) recently proposed a hierarchical network representation method to 
calculate the disconnection probabilities for large networks by identifying clusters based on the 
network topology and developing a simplified network of super-nodes and super-links 
representing the identified clusters and inter-cluster connections. For system reliability analysis 
of the simplified network, the identified clusters are assumed to be unbreakable super-nodes in 
computing disconnection probabilities with the remaining links. The main objective of this 
clustering-based multi-scale approach is to identify and understand the hierarchical structure of 
the network and perform network reliability analysis efficiently. It is noted that the assumption 
of unbreakable super-nodes may result in significant difference in network reliability estimates. 
Furthermore, as shown in Lim and Song (2012), the effect of spatial correlation between 
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component failures needs to be considered at each hierarchical level for accurate seismic risk 
assessment. 
In this chapter, a new clustering-based multi-scale approach is developed based on spectral 
clustering algorithms and the selective RDA in order to overcome computational challenges in 
risk assessment of large-size lifeline networks. The approach identifies an adequate number of 
clusters by use of spectral clustering algorithms. For each of the identified clusters, the 
connectivity among the source node, terminal node and the nodes connected to the inter-cluster 
links is described by super-links. By use of the selective RDA, the failure probabilities of the 
super-links and the statistical dependence between the failures of components and super-
components are evaluated. If the simplified network consisting of these super components is still 
exceedingly large for the selective RDA to handle, additional levels of hierarchical clustering are 
introduced. After summarizing an existing clustering-based multi-scale approach (Gómez et al. 
2013), this paper presents the new clustering-based multi-scale approach. The proposed approach 
is then demonstrated by numerical examples of a hypothetical network, the main gas 
transmission pipeline network of California in USA, and the main water transmission pipeline 
network of Sejong city in South Korea for assumed earthquake hazard scenarios.  
4.2. Review of Existing Hierarchical Modeling of Network Based on Clustering 
The Gómez et al. (2013) proposed a clustering-based network reliability analysis method to 
understand the hierarchical structure of a large-size network and to overcome the computational 
complexity. This approach is similar to the aforementioned multi-scale approaches in that a 
network can be simplified by replacing a group of closely interconnected components with a 
representative super-component. The main difference is that this approach systematically 
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identifies the groups of closely interconnected components, so-called clusters by means of a 
clustering algorithm instead of manual and/or arbitrary groupings. For a “link-based” network, 
the links in an identified cluster are consolidated to an unbreakable super-node and the links 
between the clusters are constructed by parallel arrangements of the actual links between the 
clusters. For a “node-based” network, the nodes in an identified cluster are consolidated to a 
super-node. The failure probability of the super-node is determined as the probability that at least 
one of the nodes or every node inside the cluster fails. Although Gómez et al. (2013) did not 
specify, a general network with both breakable nodes and links can be also clustered by 
combining the two modeling approaches. Once the clustering is completed, the disconnection 
probabilities are calculated using the simplified network consisting of the identified super-
components. Although the approach greatly reduces the computational cost, the assumptions 
made in modeling super-components may result in significant difference in the network 
reliability evaluations. Having more small-sized clusters may improve the accuracy but increases 
the computational cost. Gómez et al. (2013) suggested that the level of trade-off between speed 
and accuracy can be determined based on the decision-maker’s needs using a hierarchical 
representation method. 
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(a) Hierarchical Representation – Level 1 
 
 
(b) Hierarchical Representation – Level 2 
 
 
(c) Hierarchical Representation – Level 3 
 
 
 
(d) Hierarchical Representation – Level 4 
 
Figure 4.1     Illustrative example of hierarchical network representation 
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Figure 4.2     Impact of hierarchical modeling on probability of disconnection 
 
This approach is illustrated using an example network shown in Figure 4.1. The network 
topology was originally used in Gómez et al. (2013) to explain the concept of hierarchical 
representation. In this section, an earthquake scenario with a moment magnitude 7.0 located at 
the top left of the network is assumed to compute the probability of disconnection between node 
1 and node 11 at multiple hierarchical levels. As shown in Figure 4.1(a), at the first hierarchical 
representation (Level 1), all network components are consolidated to the single unbreakable node. 
Thus, the probability of disconnection, Pf is zero (see Figure 4.2 for the probabilities of 
disconnection at all hierarchical levels). At the next hierarchical representation (Level 2) in 
Figure 4.1(b), the network is divided into two clusters, V1
(2)
={v1, v2, v3, v4, v7} and V2
(2)
={v5, 
v6, v8, v9, v10, v11}, each of which is represented by unbreakable nodes, i.e., Pf(V1
(2)
)= Pf(V2
(2)
)=0. 
For simplicity, the statistical dependence between components is neglected. Therefore, the 
failure probability of the super-link (2)1,2E can be calculated by the product of the failure 
probabilities of the links cut by the clustering, i.e., (2)1,2 4,5 7,8 7,10( ) ( )f fP E P e e e  
4,5 7,8 7,10( ) ( ) ( ) 0.2416f f fP e P e P e  . At this hierarchical level, the failure probability of this super-link 
directly gives the probability of disconnection. At Level 3, shown in Figure 4.1(c), each cluster 
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of Level 2 is further divided to have a total of four clusters. The failure probabilities of the super-
links are computed using the same method. Under the assumptions of the unbreakable super-
nodes and statistical independence between link failures, the RDA is used to compute the 
probability of disconnection between the two clusters including node 1 and 11 (Pf = 0.3558). At 
the last step of hierarchical representation (Level 4) shown in Figure 4.1(d), no clustering is 
made and the probability of disconnection is estimated as 0.9824 by the RDA. 
As shown in Figure 4.2, the error by the hierarchical representation increases as the 
number of the clusters decreases (or the size of the cluster increases). The significant error arises 
mainly from representing the cluster as an unbreakable super-node because the connectivity 
between a node in a cluster and an inter-cluster link can be lost because of the failures of 
components in the cluster. It is also noted that Gómez et al. (2013) did not consider the statistical 
dependence between component failures while computing the failure probabilities of the inter-
cluster links or super-links, and the probability of disconnection. As demonstrated in Song and 
Ok (2010), and Lim and Song (2012), neglecting statistical dependence of component failures 
caused by spatial correlation of seismic intensities may result in significant difference in network 
reliability calculations. Finally, it is noted that Gómez et al. (2013) checked all combinations of 
the component failures and survivals to calculate the probability of disconnection. The number of 
the combinations is 2
n
 where n denotes the number of nodes and links that could fail. This 
analysis approach may require large computational time cost, and thus an advanced algorithm 
such as the selective RDA needs to be used for reliability analysis at each level. 
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4.3.  Network Reliability Analysis Using Clustering-based Multi-scale Approach 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the selective RDA can handle statistical dependence between 
component failures caused by spatial correlation, and identify critical disjoint cut sets and link 
sets for effective calculation of probability of disconnection. However, the computational time 
may increase rapidly as the number of components in a network exceeds a certain level. The 
hierarchical representation method summarized in Section 4.2 can reduce the size of the network 
problem and improve computational efficiency, but the assumption of unbreakable super-nodes, 
neglecting statistical dependence and the lack of an efficient network algorithm to compute the 
probability of disconnection may hamper the accuracy.  
For efficient and accurate reliability analysis of large-size lifeline networks, in this 
section, these two approaches are integrated as follows. First, clusters are identified based on the 
network topology by use of spectral clustering algorithms. If the size of the simplified network is 
still large, additional levels of clustering can be employed through a hierarchical modelling 
structure. Next, the likelihoods of connectivity scenarios around a given cluster are represented 
by the reliabilities of super-links without employing the assumption of unbreakable super-nodes. 
The selective RDA approach is used at each hierarchical representation level to calculate the 
failure probabilities of super-links, their statistical dependence, disconnection probability and 
component importance measures such as CPIMs. The proposed method considers the spatial 
correlation of seismic intensities throughout the process. 
4.3.1. Identification of clusters using spectral clustering algorithms 
An ideal clustering would minimize the number of the original links connecting clusters, i.e. 
inter-cluster links, while the numbers of the nodes in the identified clusters are adequately 
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distributed, e.g. avoiding a cluster consisting of few nodes. The “mincut” algorithm is often used 
to identify clusters that would minimize the number of inter-cluster links. However, the mincut 
algorithm may identify a single node as a cluster (Von Luxburg 2007). In order to overcome this 
challenge, the proposed approach uses a spectral clustering algorithm to keep the number of 
nodes in each cluster reasonably large while the number of cuts is minimized. A spectral 
clustering algorithm minimizes the ratio of the number of the cuts to the cluster size instead of 
minimizing the number of the cuts directly.  
There exist two spectral clustering algorithms depending on how the cluster size is 
defined in the ratio. First, the so-called “ratio cut” approach (Hagen and Kahng 1992) defines the 
size of a cluster iA  as the total number of the nodes in the cluster, denoted by iA . This approach 
aims to minimize the objective function 
1
1 1
( , ) ( , )1
( , , )
2
k k
i i i i
k
i ii i
W A A cut A A
Rcut A A
A A 
  
                               
(4.1) 
where k  denotes the number of the clusters, ( , )iiW A A  is the sum of the weighted links between 
the cluster iA  and the rest of the network, and ( , ) ( , ) / 2i ii icut A A W A A . By contrast, the so-
called “normalized cut” approach (Shi and Malik 2000) defines the size of the cluster as the sum 
of the total link weights on intra-cluster directed links from the nodes in the cluster, which is 
denoted by ( )ivol A  in the following objective function: 
1
1 1
( , ) ( , )1
( , , )
2 ( ) ( )
k k
i i i i
k
i ii i
W A A cut A A
Ncut A A
vol A vol A 
  
                               
(4.2) 
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Spectral clustering algorithms use graph Laplacian matrices to describe these objective 
functions (Mohar 1991, Mohar1997, Chung 1997). In the relaxing processes of the objective 
functions, Rcut in Eq. (4.1) leads to an “unnormalized” spectral clustering method, which uses 
unnormalized Laplacian matrices. By contrast, Ncut in Eq. (4.2) leads to a “normalized” spectral 
clustering method, which uses normalized Laplacian matrices. In the numerical examples of this 
paper, both spectral clustering methods are used to obtain the best clustering results. 
One of the common issues in using clustering algorithms is how to determine the number 
of clusters (k) because an adequate number of clusters should be predetermined to start the 
clustering process as k appears in the objective functions in Eq. (4.1) and Eq. (4.2). Typically, the 
number can be determined by monitoring the eigenvalues of the graph Laplacian matrix. After 
the eigenvalues are arranged in the descending order, suppose the first k eigenvalues λ1, …,λk are 
relatively large while there is a relatively big drop between λk and λk+1. Then, the spectral 
clustering algorithm aims to identify k clusters from the network. In other words, the number k is 
chosen when the gap between the eigenvalues, γk=|λk+1λk | is the largest (Kong et al. 2010).   
 
4.3.2. Representation of identified clusters by super-links 
For accurate multi-scale analysis, the connectivity among the source node, terminal node and the 
nodes connected to the inter-cluster links in an identified cluster needs to be described properly 
during the analysis using the simplified network. In the proposed approach, the connectivity is 
represented by super-links, whose definitions depend on the relative location of the source and 
terminal nodes with respect to the identified cluster. The following sub-sections provide detailed 
explanation on super-link representation for three different cases and how to evaluate statistical 
dependence between super-links. 
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4.3.2.1. Modeling clusters and reliability evaluation of super-links 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 4.3     Modeling clusters – Case I: either the source or terminal node is located inside the  
cluster: (a) identified cluster and simplified representation by inter-cluster nodes 
and super-links, and (b) reliability evaluations of super-links 
 
First, consider a case in which either the source or terminal node is located inside the identified 
cluster, as shown in Figure 4.3(a). In the figure, the source and terminal nodes are represented by 
star markers while a triangle marker indicates a node connected to an inter-cluster link (termed 
as “inter-cluster” node). The connectivity between the source/terminal node in the cluster and 
each of the inter-cluster links needs to be described by a super-link represented by a thick gray 
line, as shown in Figure 4.3(a). Therefore, a cluster with n inter-cluster links and either source or 
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terminal node in a bi-directional network is represented by n inter-cluster nodes (triangle markers 
in the figure) and n super-links (double lines). There liabilities of such inter-cluster nodes are the 
same as those of the corresponding original nodes in the cluster. There liability of a super-link is 
the same as the probability that the source/terminal node and the corresponding inter-cluster 
node remains connected, which can be calculated by the selective RDA for the corresponding 
sub-network, as shown in Figure 4.3(b).  
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 4.4     Modeling clusters – Case II: neither the source nor terminal nodes are located  
inside the cluster: (a) identified cluster and simplified representation by inter-
cluster nodes and super-links, and (b) reliability evaluations of super-links 
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Second, let us consider a case in which neither source nor terminal node is located inside 
the identified cluster, as shown in Figure 4.4(a). The cluster is then represented by super-links 
connecting the inter-cluster nodes. For a cluster in a bi-directional network that has n inter-
cluster nodes, n(n1)/2 super-links therefore need to be introduced. The failure probabilities of 
the inter-cluster nodes are the same as those of the original nodes. The failure probability of a 
super-link is obtained by computing the probability that the corresponding inter-cluster nodes are 
disconnected from each other using the selective RDA. During this analysis, the other inter-
cluster nodes and the links connected to those nodes should be removed, as illustrated in Figure 
4.4(b). This is to avoid overestimating the reliability of a super-link. 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 4.5     Modeling clusters – Case III: both the source and terminal nodes are located inside 
 the cluster: (a) identified cluster and simplified representation by inter-cluster nodes 
and super-links, and (b) reliability evaluations of super-links 
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Finally, if both source and terminal nodes are located inside the identified cluster as 
shown in Figure 4.5(a), three types of super-links are introduced: i) a super-link connecting the 
source and terminal nodes; ii) super-links connecting the source node and the inter-cluster nodes; 
and iii) super-links connecting the terminal node and the inter-cluster nodes. When such a cluster 
has n inter-cluster nodes, (1+2n) super-links are therefore needed. In order to avoid 
overestimating the reliability, the selective RDA for the super-link between the terminal and 
source nodes needs to exclude the inter-cluster nodes while the selective RDA for the super-link 
connecting an inter-cluster node with the source or terminal node excludes the terminal or source 
node, respectively. This is illustrated in Figure 4.5(b). 
 
4.3.2.2. Evaluating statistical dependence between failures of super-components 
After representing the identified clusters by inter-cluster nodes and super-links as described 
above, for accurate evaluation of network disconnection probabilities using the simplified 
network, it is necessary to evaluate the statistical dependence among the failures of the super-
links. Additionally, the statistical dependence needs to be evaluated for each pair consisting of a 
super-link and one of the remaining original components. In the proposed approach, the 
statistical dependence is evaluated by finding the correlation coefficients between the standard 
normal random variables representing the failures of super-links and original components. 
Let iZ  denote the standard normal variable representing the failures of an original 
component or a super-link. The failure event iE  can be described by βi iZ    where βi  is the 
generalized reliability index of ,iE  i.e.  
1β ( )i iP E
   where ( )   denotes the cumulative 
distribution function (CDF) of the standard normal distribution. By either component reliability 
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analysis (original component) or system reliability analysis by the RDA (super-link), the failure 
probability ( )iP E can be computed. Then, the generalized reliability index βi is evaluated. 
During the system reliability analysis using the simplified network, the probabilities of 
disjoint cut sets and link sets (identified by the selective RDA) need to be computed to obtain the 
bounds in Eq. (3.9). For example, the probability of a disjoint cut set in the simplified network, 
denoted by s
iC , can be computed as 
 ( ) β
i
sCi
s
i k k n
k S
P C P Z

 
      
 
 
R
                                     
(4.3) 
where s
iC
S  is the index set of the components that belong to the cut set siC , in  is the total 
number of indices in the index set s
iC
S , ( )
in
   is the multivariate CDF with 
in  standard normal 
random variables,   is the vector of the reliability indices of the components belonging to the 
cut set ,siC  and R  is the matrix of correlation coefficients between kZ ’s, which describes the 
statistical dependence between the failures of the components in the simplified network. The 
multivariate normal CDF can be computed by use of an efficient algorithm (Genz 1992, Kang 
and Song 2010). Eq. (4.3) clearly shows that the correlation coefficients for the pairs involving 
super-link(s) need to be evaluated. In the proposed approach, the correlation coefficients are 
obtained as follows. 
In order to compute the correlation coefficient between 
iZ and jZ ( )i j , i.e. ρij , the 
probability of the joint failure, ( ) ( β β )i j i i j jP E E P Z Z      needs to be first computed. 
Suppose 
iE  and jE  represent the failures of a super-link and an original component respectively. 
69 
 
If the failure of the super-link is described by disjoint cut sets identified by the selective RDA, 
the joint failure probability is computed as 
11
( ) ( )
i i
C C
i i
n n
E E
i j k j k j
kk
P E E P C E P C E

   
    
   

                                       
(4.4) 
where iE
kC  is the k-th disjoint cut set that describes the failure of the i-th super-link, i.e. the 
disconnection of the corresponding sub-network, identified by the (selective) RDA, 1,..., iCk n . 
The probability can be computed by the summation because i
E
k jC E ’s are disjoint to each other as 
a result of mutual exclusiveness of  the cut sets ,i
E
kC 1,..., .
i
Ck n  If both iE  and jE  represent the 
failures of super-links, the joint failure probability is computed as 
1 11 1
( ) ( )
j ji i
C C C C
j ji i
nn nn
E EE E
i j k l k l
k lk l
P E E P C C P C C
  
    
       
     

                             
(4.5) 
From a formula to compute the bivariate CDF (Ditlevsen and Madsen 1996), the joint 
probability can be expressed in terms of the generalized reliability indexes and the correlation 
coefficient, i.e., 
ρ
2
0
( ) ( β β )
( β ) ( β ) φ ( β , β ,ρ) ρ
ij
i j i i j j
i j i j
P E E P Z Z
d
    
                                          
(4.6) 
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where 2
φ ( )
 is the bivariate probability density function (PDF) of standard normal distributions. 
After substituting 
( )i jP E E (computed by Eq. (4.4) or Eq. (4.5)), and 
βi  and 
β j  into Eq. (4.6), 
the correlation coefficient ρij  can be obtained by solving the equation numerically. 
A potential drawback of this approach is that the number of the components involved in 
computing ( )i jP E E may be large, which may increase the computational cost. However, it is 
noted from numerical examples that a partial set of critical disjoint cut sets or link sets allows for 
reasonable accuracy in calculating the correlation coefficient. This is because the lack of 
noncritical disjoint sets will reduce both ( )i jP E E  and ( β ) ( β )i j     
in Eq. (4.6), and thus 
make insignificant impact on the difference ( ) ( β ) ( β )i j i jP E E      from which the 
correlation coefficient is computed. 
 
4.3.3. Multi-scale network reliability analysis 
After representing the identified clusters with super-links and calculating the failure probabilities 
of the super-links and the correlation coefficients, the selective RDA is applied to the simplified 
network. The probability of each identified disjoint set is computed by a multivariate normal 
CDF as shown in Eq. (4.3). The network connection or disconnection probabilities are obtained 
by summing up the probabilities of the identified sets by Eq. (3.9), and CPIMs are computed by 
Eqs. (2.19) or (2.20). 
If the simplified network is still too large for efficient evaluations by the selective RDA, 
clusters are identified at multiple levels. This hierarchical representation is effective when a 
network is too complex to be clustered at once or the large-size of the network prevents effective 
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system reliability analysis by the selective RDA in computing either network disconnection 
probability (large number of clusters) or super-link probabilities (large clusters). 
 
 
Figure 4.6     Hierarchical identification of clusters (left) and multi-scale network reliability 
 analysis (right) 
 
Figure 4.6 illustrates the hierarchical representation of a hypothetical network (left) and 
multi-scale network reliability analysis (right). The original network in the figure has 42 nodes 
and 85 bi-directional links. When the network is represented by six clusters (Level 3) identified 
by the spectral clustering algorithm, the simplified network has 17 nodes and 25 bi-directional 
links. This allows for a “bi-scale” analysis that uses the original network and Level 3. Even 
though the reduction significantly reduced the computational cost, it was observed that 50% of 
Uni-scale 
Level 1 
Level 2 
Level 3 
Original 
Tri-scale 
Bi-scale 
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the computational time of the bi-scale analysis was used to conduct the RDA analysis of the 
simplified network. This indicates that the simplified network at Level 3 is still large. Hence, 
additional level of clustering (Level 2) is introduced for a “tri-scale” analysis. The reliabilities of 
the super-links in the simplified network at Level 2 are computed by the selective RDA at Level 
3. As shown in Figure 4.6, the simplified network at Level 2has 6 nodes and 6 links, which 
greatly reduces computational cost of the RDA analysis. 
 
4.4. Numerical Examples 
In order to test and demonstrate the clustering-based multi-scale approach, three network 
examples are considered: a hypothetical network example, a main gas distribution network in 
California, USA, and a main water distribution network in Sejong City, South Korea. The 
probability of disconnection between two points is computed by use of the uni-scale approach 
(i.e., applying the selective RDA to the original network without clustering) as well as the 
clustering-based multi-scale approach. For the multi-scale approach, bi-scale (one level of 
clustering) and tri-scale (two hierarchical levels of clustering) analyses are performed to study 
the impact of the network size and hierarchical modeling on the efficiency and accuracy. The 
conditional probability based importance measures (CPIMs) of stations and links are also 
computed by each approach and their accuracy and efficiency are compared. The computational 
time costs reported hereinafter are based on the use of MATLAB®  on two personal computers: 
(1) Intel Core 2 DuoT6400 2.00GHz CPU and 4GB RAM, and (2) AMD Athlon II X2 260 
1.80GHz CPU and 2GB RAM, which gave similar results. 
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4.4.1.  Computing component failure probabilities and joint failure probabilities 
In computing the failure probabilities of individual components and their joint failure 
probabilities in the numerical examples, the followings are adopted from the examples in 
Chapter 3: 
 The attenuation models and spatial correlation models of peak ground velocity (PGV) 
and peak ground acceleration (PGA). 
 The method to compute the failure probabilities of individual line-type components, e.g. 
pipelines, and their joint failure probabilities based on the assumption that the failure 
locations on a line-type element follow a homogeneous Poisson process. 
 The method to compute the failure probabilities of individual node-type components, e.g. 
stations, using the fragility models developed for the components, and their joint failure 
probabilities. 
 The statistical dependence between a node-type component and a link-type component is 
ignored (mainly due to the lack of a spatial correlation model between different seismic 
intensity measures used for the fragility models). 
4.4.2. Example 1: hypothetical network 
The hypothetical network example in Figure 4.7 (the same network topology used in Figure 4.6) 
has 42 nodes and 85 physical links. Since each link in the network is bi-directional, the total 
number of components is 212 (=42+852). It is noted that the maximum number of components 
that the uni-scale selective RDA handled in Lim and Song (2012) is 128. The analysis uses a 
scenario earthquake with a moment magnitude of 7.0,wM   whose epicenter location is shown 
in Figure 4.7. The spectral clustering algorithm identifies two clusters at Level 2 and six clusters 
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at Level 3, as shown in Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.8. In Figure 4.8, the thick gray lines in Figure 4.8 
represent super-links in the simplified network and the triangle markers show the inter-cluster 
nodes. 
 
 
Figure 4.7     Hypothetical network example 
 
The simplified network of the bi-scale analysis has 17 nodes and 25 bi-directional links. 
Therefore, the total number of components is reduced from 212 to 67 (=17+252). The proposed 
clustering-based bi-scale analysis computes the bounds on the disconnection probability as 
0.431~0.441 (1% gap between the bounds) in 493 seconds while the direct application of the 
selective RDA, i.e., the uni-scale analysis could not converge to the bound width even in a few 
days. The tri-scale approach further reduces the number of components in the simplified network 
into 18 (6 nodes and 6 bi-directional links) and the bounds on the disconnection probability are 
computed as 0.439~0.448 in 326 seconds. It is seen that the proposed clustering-based 
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approaches greatly improve the efficiency while matching the failure probability estimated by 
Monte Carlo simulations, Pf = 0.434. Table 4.1 summarizes the results. 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 4.8     Hierarchical representation of the hypothetical network example for (a) bi-scale,  
and (b) tri-scale analysis 
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Table 4.1   Analysis results for hypothetical network example (Mw = 7.0, MCS Pf=0.434) 
Analysis 
Scale 
No. of 
Comp. 
Correlations Considered Correlations Not Considered 
Pf Computational 
Time 
Pf Computational 
Time 
Uni-scale  
Bi-scale 
Tri-scale 
212 
67 
18 
N/A  
0.431~0.441 
0.439~0.448 
not even in a few days 
  493sec 
 326sec 
N/A  
0.335~0.346 
0.335~0.343 
not even in a few days 
33sec 
 8sec 
 
It is noted that the tri-scale approach achieves similar width of bounds using 66% of the 
computational time of the bi-scale approach. This is because the fewer number of components in 
the simplified network of the tri-scale approach makes the selective RDA more efficient. 
However, it should be noted that the additional hierarchical level requires computations for 
modeling the simplified network, i.e. computing super-component probabilities and correlations 
between (super-)components. Therefore, for optimal performance, the number of hierarchical 
modeling levels needs to be determined based on computational trade-offs between selective 
RDA and simplified network representations. In the examples of this paper, it was observed that 
most of the computational time required for modeling the simplified network is used for 
calculating the correlations. 
When the correlation between (super-)components in the network representation process 
is ignored, the disconnection probability is estimated as 0.335~0.346 by the bi-scale approach in 
33 seconds, and as 0.335~0.343 by the tri-scale approach in 8 seconds. This result demonstrates 
that the correlations between (super-)components spend the most of the computational time 
while they need to be computed accurately during a multi-scale network analysis for accurate 
results. To test the performance of the method for low-probability events, an earthquake scenario 
with a moment magnitude of 6.3wM   is also considered. As shown in Table 4.2, the proposed 
method can obtain the bounds of 0.1% gap accurately and efficiently. 
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Table 4.2   Analysis results for hypothetical network example (Mw = 6.3) 
Analysis Scale Failure Probability,Pf 
(MCS: 0.0527)  
No. of 
Comp.  
Computational 
Time  
Uni-scale  0.0511~0.0521 212 46,597 sec  
Bi-scale 0.0519~0.0529 67     675 sec  
Tri-scale 0.0523~0.0532 18 244 sec  
 
 
Figure 4.9     Simplified California main gas network example 
 
4.4.3.  Example 2: simplified California main gas network 
The simplified California main gas network example in Figure 4.9 has 73 nodes and 85 bi-
directional links, and thus the total number of components is 243 (=73+852). A scenario 
earthquake with a moment magnitude of 7.9wM  is chosen. The spectral clustering algorithm 
identifies two clusters at Level 2 and four clusters at Level 3 (two from each cluster at Level 2), 
as shown in Figure 4.10. Due to the complexity of the network topology, Figure 4.10 shows the 
clusters by use of different markers at the nodes instead of drawing boundary lines as in Figure 
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4.8. The numbers of components for the simplified networks of bi-scale and tri-scale analyses are 
44 (12 nodes and 16 bi-directional links) and 10 (4 nodes and 3 bi-directional links), respectively. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 4.10   Hierarchical representation of the California main gas network example for (a) bi- 
scale, and (b) tri-scale analysis 
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Table 4.3   Analysis results for simplified California main gas network example 
Analysis Scale Failure Probability,Pf 
(MCS: 0.479)  
No. of 
Comp.  
Computational 
Time  
Uni-scale  0.473~0.483 243  30,133sec 
Bi-scale 0.469~0.479 44  268sec 
Tri-scale 0.475~0.485 10  262sec 
 
The results summarized in Table 4.3 show that the proposed clustering-based approach 
greatly improves the efficiency without compromising accuracy. In particular, the tri-scale 
analysis obtains similar results with only 0.87% of the computational time of the uni-scale 
analysis. Table 4.4 shows the pipelines that have the highest values of the conditional probability 
based importance measures (CPIMs). The “Computational Time” in the table means an 
additional time needed to calculate CPIMs after the network reliability analysis. It is shown that 
the multi-scale approach greatly reduces the computational time needed to identify important 
components. 
 
Table 4.4   Pipelines in gas network with the highest CPIM values  
Node IDs 
 Analysis Scale  
Uni-scale Bi-scale Tri-scale 
Pipelines 
109 0.781 0.784 0.781 
107 0.688 0.694 0.691 
110 0.656 0.652 0.649 
Computational Time 227,499 sec 398 sec 3 sec 
 
4.4.4.  Example 3: simplified main water network in Sejong City, Korea 
Figure 4.11 shows the simplified main water network in Sejong City in South Korea, which has 
59 nodes and 99 bi-directional links. The total number of components is thus 257 (=59+992). 
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The spectral clustering algorithm identifies two clusters at Level 2 and four clusters at Level 3 
(two from each cluster at Level 2) as shown in Figure 4.12. As shown in Table 4.5 and Table 4.6, 
the proposed multi-scale analysis approach demonstrates accuracy and great improvement in 
efficiency even for a loop-like network topology. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.11   Simplified main water network example of Sejong City, Korea 
 
Table 4.5   Analysis results for Sejong city network example 
Analysis Scale Failure Probability,Pf 
(MCS: 0.802)  
No. of 
Comp.  
Computational 
Time  
Uni-scale  N/A  257  Not even in a few days  
Bi-scale 0.802~0.831 66  4,587sec  
Tri-scale 0.803~0.833 26  3,712 sec  
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 4.12   Hierarchical representation of the water distribution network example for (a) bi- 
scale, and (b) tri-scale analysis  
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Table 4.6   Stations and pipelines in Sejong city network with the highest CPIM values  
Node IDs  Approach Type  
Uni-scale Bi-scale Tri-scale 
Stations 
54 N/A 0.266 0.266 
46 N/A 0.255 0.254 
21 N/A 0.252 0.252 
Pipelines 
  85 N/A 0.721 0.722 
158 N/A 0.683 0.682 
81 N/A 0.676 0.675 
Computational Time N/A 32,754 sec 162sec 
 
 
4.5. Summary 
In this chapter, a new multi-scale analysis approach using a clustering-based network 
representation is developed for efficient and effective network reliability analysis of large and 
complex networks. For this purpose, spectral clustering algorithms are first used to identify 
clusters in a network such that the number of inter-cluster link is minimized while the number of 
nodes in clusters is reasonably large. The connectivity around the identified clusters is 
represented by inter-cluster nodes and super-links whose reliabilities and statistical dependence 
with other (super-)components are computed by use of the selective recursive decomposition 
algorithm (RDA).The selective RDA algorithm is then applied to the simplified network to 
compute bounds on the network disconnection probability. If the simplified network is still too 
large, a hierarchical clustering approach is applied. The performance of the proposed multi-scale 
network reliability analysis method is demonstrated by a hypothetical network example, the main 
gas transmission pipeline network of California and the main water distribution network of 
Sejong, Korea for given earthquake hazard scenarios. 
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In all three examples, the proposed approach shows great improvement in computational 
efficiency without compromising accuracy. For a large network, the computational time can be 
further decreased by using the hierarchical clustering approach. The computational benefit of the 
hierarchical approach becomes more conspicuous for a larger network. The hierarchical 
approach improves the efficiency in computing the conditional probability importance measures 
(CPIM) as well. 
The clustering-based multi-scale approach helps overcomes computational challenges in 
seismic risk analysis of a large and complex network. This efficient and effective analysis tool 
for lifeline network risk assessment will help emergency managers prepare for and conduct 
disaster response and mitigation operations based on the quantified risk. 
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5. MULTI-SCALE MULTI-CRITERA DECISION MAKING FOR RETROFITTING 
PRIORITIZATION OF LIFELINE NETWORKS 
 
Many urban lifeline networks had been built before proper structural codes against hazards were 
introduced. Even if designed appropriately, the component structures may deteriorate 
significantly over time. American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) evaluated the current 
America’s infrastructure GPA as D plus and claimed that 3.6 trillion dollars should be invested 
to retrofit them all by 2020 (ASCE 2013). The current society thus faces a matter of choice in 
that the available budget is always limited while a tremendous amount of money is needed to fix 
all the under-designed or deteriorating structures. However, the preference-setting for retrofitting 
of lifeline network components is much complicated due to trade-offs among decision-making 
criteria, interaction of network components, re-retrofitting effects and others.  Thus, in this 
chapter, an efficient multi-scale multi-criteria decision making framework is introduced to set the 
retrofitting priorities of lifeline network components by using the utility theory and the analytical 
network reliability approaches presented in the previous chapters.   
 
5.1.  Introduction 
The complexity of lifeline network problems makes it more complicated to determine which 
component should be retrofitted with preferences for several technical reasons. First of all, the 
decision making problems typically involve multiple conflicting criteria in comparing the 
preferences for retrofitting network components. For example, retrofitting costs typically rise as 
one attempts to improve component reliability. Decision makers should also consider several 
other conflicting criteria such as retrofitting effects, construction costs, and traffic disruption by 
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construction. Thus, decision makers are inevitably faced with trade-offs among the multiple 
conflicting criteria and need an effective tool to handle the trade-off issues. This is a so-called  
“multi-criteria decision making problem.” Second of all, the complicated network topology 
makes a decision making process more difficult because the importance of a component varies 
with its relative location in the network system. In other words, the importance of one 
component may not be the same as the other component even though both of them have the same 
preferences from the component level perspective. On top of it, the completion of the retrofitting 
project of one component may affect the overall preference order. That is, even though a 
prioritization list is set, the prioritization list could be significantly changed after conducting the 
retrofitting project for a component with higher preference because of the re-retrofitting effects 
on the network performance. This is a so-called “network level problem.” 
Many studies have been conducted to develop adequate methodologies in prioritizing the 
retrofitting of lifeline network components. Chang and Nojima (2001) proposed some network 
performance measures of components – total length of open network components, total distance-
based accessibility or areal distance-based accessibility, and then prioritized the seismic retrofit 
of individual highway bridges with consideration of network effects. However, their network 
performance measures depend only a single criterion for decision making. Several researchers 
proposed other network component importance measures to evaluate and rank the contributions 
of components to the failure probability of a network (Fusselll 1973, Vinod et al. 2003, Anders 
1990, Song and Gang 2009). The measures also depend on a single criterion, i.e., component 
failure probability. On the other hands, Patidar et al. (2007) used the utility theory to develop a 
basis upon which many conflicting criteria can be systematically synthesized for each bridge and 
the preference order of retrofitting bridges could be constructed in transportation networks. The 
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concept of utility was used as a representative of preference to synthesize the conflicting 
preferences from the multiple criteria. However, they failed to consider the effects of network 
topology or interactions of network components because the approach evaluates individual 
bridges (i.e., components) without consideration of their connectivity with other bridges. 
In this chapter, in order to overcome the limitations of the above-mentioned approaches, 
a new multi-scale multi-criteria decision making approach for lifeline networks is developed by 
incorporating the component-level multi-criteria utility theory into the analytical network 
reliability methods presented in Chapters 3 and 4. As for the component level, the conflicting 
criteria such as vulnerability, retrofitting effects, traffic congestion costs and retrofitting costs are 
synthesized into a “stand-alone” utility for each component by using the multi-criteria utility 
function. The stand-alone utility for each component is then used for developing another utility 
by using the network reliability analysis methodology, which is called the CPIM (Component 
Probability based Importance Measure) utility with consideration of the component’s 
connectivity or importance in the network topology. The “selective” RDA of Chapter 3 and the 
clustering-based multi-scale analysis approach of Chapter 4 are used to calculate the CPIM 
utilities of components. A binary integer programming subject to a budgetary constraint is 
applied to select a set of retrofitting project candidates, which maximizes the summation of their    
CPIM utilities under the budgetary constraint. Next, the single project with the most CPIM utility 
among them should be chosen and the process should then be repeated using the updated CPIM 
utilities with a new stand-alone utility for the selected component (i.e., set to zero because of the 
lowest preference for retrofitting) until the available budget is exhausted because of the re-
retrofitting effects, i.e., a retrofitted component may affect the preferences of the other 
components in the network. The accuracy and efficiency of the proposed approach are 
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demonstrated by numerical examples of a hypothetical network, the gas transmission pipeline 
network of Shelby County in Tennessee, USA, and the main water transmission pipeline network 
of Shelby County in Tennessee, USA, and Sejong city in South Korea for assumed earthquake 
hazard scenarios. 
 
5.2. Multi-scale Multi-criteria Decision Making Framework of Lifeline Networks  
Decision making is a process of making one or more selections over a set of alternatives based 
on the decision maker’s satisfaction or preferences from the selections, which is in general very 
subjective and hard to quantify. Economists introduced the term of utility as a measure of the 
decision maker’s satisfaction or preferences and assumed that people act rationally, i.e., they will 
make selections so as to maximize the total utility (Marshall 1920, Clemen and Reilly 2001). The 
utility typically ranges from 0 to 1, where the alternative with the highest preference has 1 and 
the one with the lowest preference has 0. However, faced with multiple criteria, decision makers 
are frequently stuck in trouble in quantifying the overall preferences due to the above-mentioned 
trade-offs among the multiple criteria. As for a lifeline network problem, the quantifying process 
is even more complicated because the interaction of components in a network should be 
considered to calculate the component utilities. In summary, in the decision making problem of 
lifeline networks, one should be able to handle two main issues: trade-offs and interaction of 
components.  
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Figure 5.1     Multi-scale decision making framework of a lifeline network 
 
These two issues are much difficult to handle simultaneously. Thus, they are put into a 
multi-scale approach and handled in the lower and higher scale analyses, respectively. First, the 
trade-offs of multiple criteria is handled in the lower-scale decision making analysis without the 
connectivity of components in the network (which could be called as the component level 
analysis), by using the multi-criteria utility theory based on the lifeline mechanics. The computed 
utility for each component from the lower-scale or component-level decision making analysis is 
defined as the stand-alone utility for each component. The computed stand-alone utilities from 
the lower scale or component-level analysis are then used for a network-level analysis, i.e., the 
higher-scale decision making analysis, where the network reliability analysis methods of the 
previous chapters are used to explain the interaction of components in a network. Thus, in this 
chapter, an efficient multi-scale decision making framework of lifeline networks is introduced in 
two parts (See Figure 5.1): (1) Lower-scale decision making analysis in the component level, 
where a stand-alone utility, ui(STA) for  the i-th component will be calculated using the multi-
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criteria utility theory, and (2) Higher-scale decision making analysis in the network level, where 
another utility definition, which is called the CPIM utility, ui(CPIM) for the i-th component is  
proposed. The CPIM utility is computed by using the network reliability analysis techniques 
such as the “selective” RDA of Chapter 3 and the clustering-based multi-scale analysis approach 
of Chapter 4 along with the stand-alone utilities from the lower scale decision making analysis. 
Besides these analyses, the decision making model of lifeline networks should typically consist 
of optimization methods for binary integer programming problems with constraints because the 
solution of decision making is binary, e.g., selected or unselected, with an integer form of 
retrofitting costs under a budgetary constraint. Because a retrofitting project for one component 
may affect the whole list of preferences, the CPIM utilities of other components should be 
computed repeatedly by selecting only the component with the highest CPIM utility and 
updating the stand-alone utility until the available budget is exhausted. This process could be 
time-consuming given that the network reliability analysis typically could not be conducted in a 
short time. This is where the analytical solutions of the network reliability techniques in the 
previous chapters show the merit of rapid computation because the changed component values 
can be simply substituted into the developed analytical solutions. The flowchart for retrofitting 
decision making process based on the multi-scale approach is shown in Figure 5.2. 
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 Figure 5.2     Flowchart for proposed decision making process for retrofitting 
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5.3. Lower Scale Analysis for Component-Level Decision Making Using Multi-Criteria 
Utility Theory  
Patidar et al. (2007) used the utility theory to develop a basis upon which multiple conflicting 
decision making criteria can be systematically synthesized and construct the preference order of 
retrofitting bridges in the transportation network. Even though the effects of network topology or 
interactions of network components are not considered by assuming that bridges are not 
connected each other, they proved that the utility theory could be an effective tool to handle the 
trade-off issues of many conflicting criteria. In this chapter, this methodology is utilized as the 
lower-scale analysis of the whole framework. Thus, a brief review of the utility theory for multi-
criteria decision making is first provided herein for a proper introduction of the proposed 
approach and applied to the pipeline networks. This section consists of three steps: (1) selection 
of decision making criteria, (2) development of individual utility functions, and (3) development 
of the overall multi-criteria utility function. 
 
5.3.1.  Selection of Decision Making Criteria 
A set of decision making criteria clarify the decision makers’ goal and are required to measure 
the consequences of different alternatives. If decision making criteria are not appropriately 
selected, the subsequent analysis could not produce adequate results. Keeney and Gregory (2005) 
specified the following five desirable properties of good decision making criteria: (1) 
Unambiguous—A clear relationship exists between real consequences and descriptions of 
consequences using the decision making criterion, (2) Comprehensive—The decision making 
criterion levels cover the range of possible consequences for the corresponding objective, and 
value judgments implicit in the decision making criterion are reasonable, (3) Direct—The 
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decision making criterion levels directly describe the consequences of interest, (4) Operational—
In practice, information to describe consequences can be obtained and value trade-offs can 
reasonably be made; (5) Understandable—Consequences and value trade-offs made using the 
decision making criterion can readily be understood and clearly communicated. 
This chapter focuses on the pipeline networks because of its simplicity in describing the 
interactions of components in a network. In the pipeline network, current vulnerability, 
vulnerability improvement after retrofitting, traffic congestion during retrofitting, and retrofitting 
costs could be considered as a set of decision making criteria for each component. They could be 
reasonably assumed to meet the above-mentioned requirements. Among them, current 
vulnerability and vulnerability improvement after retrofitting should be computed using the 
pipeline mechanics while traffic congestion during retrofitting and retrofitting cost are quantified 
in days and dollars respectively with consideration of site conditions, weather forecast and a 
variety of other factors.. A multi-scale network reliability approach of Chapter 2 is thus used to 
calculate the disconnection probabilities for pipelines. It is assumed that the line-typed 
components like pipelines follow a homogeneous Poisson process and uses the HAZUS-MH 
mean occurrence rate model (FEMA 2008). Based on the empirical data observed with brittle 
pipelines such as asbestos cement, concrete and cast iron pipes, the developed mean occurrence 
rate of the failure per unit length along the brittle pipeline, brittle  is proposed as: 
brittle k PGV
                                              (5.1) 
where, k and   are the model parameters and proposed to be 0.0001 and 2.25, respectively, and 
PGV is the peak ground velocity, measured or calculated from the earthquake. In the retrofitting 
projects, the brittle pipelines should be replaced with ductile pipelines such as steel, ductile iron 
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and PVC pipelines. The HAZUS-MH (2008) also shows that ductile pipelines have 30% of the 
vulnerability of brittle pipelines in the mean occurrence rate. Thus, the mean occurrence rate of 
the failure per unit length for ductile pipelines, ductile  is: 
0.3 0.3ductile brittle k PGV
                                         (5.2) 
Based on the framework of Chapter 2, current vulnerability and vulnerability improvement (i.e., 
the difference between vulnerabilities of as-built and retrofitted components) and could be 
calculated for each pipeline using Eqs. (5.1) and (5.2).  
 
5.3.2. Development of Individual Utility Functions 
For each decision making criterion, an individual utility function should be developed to 
represent the decision maker’s preference or the utility over the decision making criterion. 
Decision making criteria are typically of different units and difficult to compare one another. 
Thus, all of the individual utility functions are typically expressed on a scale of 0-1 as a uniform 
scale. For each system or goal, the utility with the worst case decision making criterion is 
typically set to be zero and the utility with the best case one set to be one. In some cases, the 
standard utility could be set for all the possible levels of the decision making criterion and used 
for the decision making criterion regardless of the system or goal.  
The individual utility function of the i-th component as a stand-alone basis for decision 
making criterion xj is denoted as ui(STA),j(xj) and it has three different forms depending on what 
risk attitude a decision maker has: (1) a decision maker who is afraid of risk or sensitive to risk is 
called risk-averse and the utility function has a concave shape, e.g., ( ), ( ) logi STA j j ju x a b x   (2) A 
decision maker with risk seeking attitudes is consistent with the convex shaped utility function, 
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e.g., ( ), ( ) exp( )i STA j j ju x a b x   and finally (3) A decision maker can be risk-neutral and the risk 
neutrality is reflected by a straight lined utility function, e.g., ( ), ( )i STA j j ju x a x . Besides the 
exampled shapes, any kind of function shapes can be chosen by a decision maker depending on 
his or her preferences.  
Based on the discussion with a panel of experts, it was found that individual utility 
functions of pipelines are risk-averse in terms of current vulnerability, vulnerability improvement, 
traffic congestion during retrofitting because of their diminishing effects in terms of decision 
maker’s preferences. A decision maker typically prefers to retrofit a component with higher 
current vulnerability and vulnerability improvement. Thus, the individual utility functions could 
be assumed to follow the following exponential function: 
, min
( ) expi j
j j
b
u x a
x x
 
  
  
                                                     (5.3)  
Thus, the individual utility value for the current vulnerability increases as the earthquake 
magnitude increases while the relationship between the value for the vulnerability improvement 
and the earthquake magnitude could not be clearly specified. The magnitude and epicenter of the 
specific dominant earthquake (e.g., an earthquake scenario with a seismic hazard of 2% in 50 
years in the area) can be determined by a dis-aggregation analysis (Adachi and Ellingwood 2008). 
For traffic congestion during retrofitting, a decision maker prefers to retrofit a component with 
the lower traffic congestion during retrofitting. Thus, the individual utility function is assumed as:  
, min
( ) 1 expi j
j j
b
u x a
x x
 
   
                                                     
(5.4) 
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For retrofitting cost, the following first order equation could be recommended because of its 
neutrality with the retrofitting cost. 
( )i j ju x ax b 
                                                              
(5.5) 
where a and b are scaling constants. xj and xj, min are the decision making criterion and its 
minimum values.  
In order to assess scaling constants in each individual utility function, two techniques are 
typically used to assess the individual utility function shape: (1) The Mid-value splitting 
technique asks the decision maker to provide his or her indifference between changes in levels of 
the decision making criterion, i.e., the decision making criterion level with the mid-value of the 
utility. This is conducted repeatedly by splitting the split range until a sufficient number of points 
are gathered. It is not only simple to implement but a consistency check could also be conducted 
by checking the utility differences between gained mid-values. (2) The direct rating method asks 
a decision maker to directly assign the values for each of the possible levels of the decision 
making criterion. It is a simple method to assess the utility function, yet more feasible for the 
decision making criterion with only a few discrete levels. 
5.3.3. Development of Multi-criteria Utility Function 
The developed individual utility functions should be synthesized into the overall multi-criteria 
utility function after assessing the individual utility functions and relative weights among them. 
Multiplicative and additive forms are typically used because of its simplicity (Keeney and Raiffa 
1976). Given the criteria X1, X2, …, Xm, the following multiplicative utility function, ui(STA),overall 
exists for the i-th component as a stand-alone basis, if and only if the criteria are mutually utility 
independent 
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( ), 1 ( ),
1
( , , ) 1 ( ) 1
m
i STA overall m j i STA j j
j
ku x x kk u x

                                        (5.6) 
where ui(STA),j(xj) represents a single-criterion or individual utility function over the criterion Xj 
for the i-th component, n is the number of components, m is the number of the decision making 
criteria, and k and ki are scaling constants or relative weights of single criterion utility functions, 
where 
1
1 1
m
j
j
k kk

     . If and only if the additive independence condition holds among the 
criteria, the following additive utility function, ui(STA),overall exists: 
( ), 1 ( ),
1
( , , ) ( )
m
i STA overall m j i STA i i
i
u x x k u x

                                          (5.7) 
where 
1
1
m
i
i
k

 . If the criteria are additive-independent, then they are utility-independent. That is,  
the additive independency is a stronger form than the utility independency. An appropriate 
functional form is selected on the basis of the results of a questionnaire from the decision maker. 
In the examples of this Chapter, the criteria could be reasonably assumed to be additive-
independent for use of the additive utility function.  Once the utility function form is determined,  
the relative weights are then assessed among individual utility functions. (1) The simplest 
method is the direct weighting method, where the decision maker assigns numerical values to 
relative weights in a direct manner. (2) The gamble method could be used by asking the decision 
maker to compare a “sure thing” and a “gamble” and choosing a relative weight at a time. (3) 
Based on principles of decomposition, comparative judgments, and synthesis of priorities, the 
analytic hierarchy method arrives at the relative weights for multiple criteria in a realistic manner 
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while allowing for differences in opinion and conflicts that exist in the real world. Aggregation 
techniques could be used along with each assessing technique to synthesize a multiple number of 
decision maker’s options. The Delphi technique (Dalkey and Helmer 1963) is a group decision 
making tool that is widely used to come to a consensus and a holistic decision through 
aggregation of judgments from individual experts. The aggregation techniques could be also 
used in assessing the above-mentioned development of individual utility functions. 
 
5.4. Higher Scale Analysis for Network-Level Decision Making Using Analytical System 
Reliability Analysis Methods 
As discussed in Section 5.3, the utility theory could efficiently handle trade-off issues among 
multiple decision criteria in the component-level analysis. The utility theory has been typically 
used in the component-based decision-making analysis, not in the network-based decision-
making analysis because of its complexity. In applying the component-level decision making 
theory to the network level, two challenging aspects, which are rising from interactions of 
components, should be handled compared with the component level analysis. The first one is that 
the importance of components greatly depends on the relative location of the component in the 
network. A component with the higher preference order of retrofitting in itself might be less 
important in terms of the network functionality and vice versa. Thus, other performance metric is 
needed to identify the component importance in the network. The second thing is that, once a 
component with a higher preference order is retrofitted in the network, the list of preference 
order for retrofitting components could be overall changed. Thus, the network-level decision 
making analysis should be conducted again with the updated information of the retrofitted 
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component to select the next component for retrofitting, which means that the network-level 
analysis needs repeated and time-consuming computational works.  
To handle with these two issues, in this section, a new network-based multi-criteria 
decision making methodology is proposed as the higher-scale analysis. The proposed approach 
incorporates component importance measures in a network using analytical network reliability 
analysis methods (i.e., the “selective” Recursive Decomposition Algorithm of Chapter 3 and the 
multi-scale analysis approach using a clustering-based network representation of Chapter 4), 
based on assessed stand-alone component utility results. Finally, an optimization technique is 
conducted to select the most preferred component, i.e., the only one component with the highest 
utility value with consideration of interactions of components, subject to a budget constraint. 
Then, after replacing the as-built component with the retrofitted component (in this chapter, it is  
simplified by setting the stand-alone component utility to be zero, which means that the 
component has the lowest preference for retrofitting), the above-mentioned procedure is repeated 
until the last project is selected or all of the budget is allocated. The proposed approach takes 
advantage of the merits of analytical solutions (i.e., rapid computation) just by substituting the 
updated utilities in the developed analytical network reliability equations. The proposed 
procedures thus consist of two major steps: (1) network-based analysis using component 
importance measures, and (2) selection of retrofitting project using optimization techniques. 
5.4.1. Network-Based Analysis Using Component Importance Measures 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, several researchers proposed various importance measures to 
evaluate and rank the contributions of components to the failure probability of a system (Fussell 
1973, Vinod et al. 2003, Anders 1990). In particular, Song and Kang (2009) used the conditional 
probability of a component’s failure given the system failure as a component importance 
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measure termed as Conditional Probability based Importance Measure (CPIM). For the system 
reliability analyses, two advanced network reliability analysis methods of the previous chapters--
the “selective” RDA in Chapter 3 and the clustering based multi-scale approach of Chapter 4 are 
used. They identify and show the disjoin cut sets and  link sets analytically, which means that the 
system reliability could be calculated just by substituting component reliability into the equations 
of disjoint cut sets and link sets. Using the identified disjoint cut sets and link sets, the CPIM of 
the i-th component, which is approximately obtained by use of either the identified disjoint cut 
sets or link sets, is shown in Eqs. (2.25) and (2.26). 
In this chapter, a new form of utility for the network-based decision making, termed as 
“CPIM component utility”, is introduced by incorporating the above-mentioned stand-alone 
utilities into the CPIM equations. In the Eqs. (2.25) and (2.26), the CPIM of the i-th component 
is defined as the conditional disconnection probability of the i-th component given the 
disconnected network between source and terminal nodes. It means that the higher CPIM 
typically results from a high value of the disconnection probability of the i-th component, P(Ei) 
or more disconnection events of the i-th component among the disjoint cut sets of the network 
between source and terminal nodes (or close interaction between the i-th component 
disconnection event and the system disconnection). This is also analogous to the preference 
setting in the decision making process using the stand-alone utility because the network-based 
decision making preference or utility for a component is typically higher when the component’s 
stand-alone utility is higher and the interaction between the component and the network 
performance is higher. Thus, if P(Ei) is a nominal component failure probability, the stand-alone 
component utility, ui(STA), is a judgmental component failure probability with consideration of the 
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decision maker’s attitude against the decision making criteria, which is furthermore expressed on 
a scale of 0-1, i.e.,  one of the basic axioms of probability. 
Thus, by substituting the stand-alone utility for each component into the component 
failure probability and handling in the same way as the component failure probability in Eqs. 
(2.25) and (2.26), the CPIM-based utility of components could be developed. For simplicity, the 
stand-alone utilities are assumed to be statistically independent each other. 
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where iU  is the judgmental failure event of the i-th component (i.e., ( )( )i i STAP U u ), and sysU  is 
the system failure event based on the judgmental failure events in a network. This CPIM-based 
utility for each component is a brand-new utility concept with consideration of interaction of 
components in a network. Thus, the higher CPIM utility means a higher preference in the 
network-based decision making process. 
5.4.2. Selection of Retrofitting Project Using Step-by-Step Optimization Technique 
The CPIM utility for each component is developed to represent a decision maker’s preference in 
the network systems. The CPIM component utilities are instrumentally used as a measure to 
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prioritize retrofitting projects because the higher CPIM component utilities mean the higher 
preference for the retrofitting project. However, the decision making should be conducted under 
the budget limitations and thus the component projects with higher CPIM utilities should not be 
unconditionally selected. If the project with the higher CPIM utility is too expensive, it may be 
better to select other multiple cheaper projects even with slightly lower CPIM utilities rather than 
to select the single expensive project with the higher utility. Thus, the approach first selects an 
adequate candidate set of potential components which maximizes the sum of their CIPM utilities 
under the budget constraint using a constraint binary integer optimization technique. Then, the 
single component with the highest CPIM utility value should be selected from the candidate set 
of potential components because once a component is retrofitted, the CPIM utility values of all 
other components could be changed. For this reason, a component for retrofitting should be 
selected one-by-one until the final component for retrofitting is selected within the budget 
constraint by re-calculating the CPIM component utilities using the updated stand-alone utility of 
the selected component. In summary, the procedure is as follows: First, the following binary 
integer problem is solved with calculated CPIM utilities for components and an adequate set of 
components are put on the candidate list for retrofitting: 
 
( )
1
1
max
. .
{0,1} 1, 2, ,
n
i CPIM i
i
n
i i avl
i
i
u X
s t RCOST X B
X i n



 

                                                  (5.9) 
 
where, Xi is 1 if the component is selected, and 0 otherwise. RCOSTi is the retrofitting cost for 
the i-th component and Bavl is the available budget for the program period. The state-of-the-art 
102 
 
optimizer for large optimization problems, IBM
®
 ILOG CPLEX is used as the optimization 
solver. Second, among the selected candidate list for retrofitting, the only one with the maximum 
CPIM utility value is selected for retrofitting. Third, the stand-alone utility for the selected 
component is put to be zero, which means no preference for retrofitting and the available budge 
Bavl is updated by subtracting the retrofitting cost from it. Then, the CPIM utility for every 
component, ui(CPIM) is recalculated with the updated information and the above-mentioned 
procedure is repeated until the available budget is exhausted. It is noted that the repeated 
computations for CPIM utilities could be conducted just by substituting the updated stand-alone 
utility into the already developed analytical network reliability equations in a significantly short 
time because the CPIM utilities for each component are computed based on the analytical 
solutions such as an advanced RDA technique and a clustering-based multi-scale approach. The 
flowchart for the above-mentioned procedures is shown in Figure 5.3. 
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Figure 5.3    Flowchart for proposed network-level multi-criteria decision making for retrofitting 
 
5.5.  Numerical Examples 
In order to test and demonstrate the proposed multi-scale multi-criteria decision making 
approach for retrofitting prioritization of lifeline networks subject to a budget constraint, four 
network examples are considered: a hypothetical network example, a gas transmission pipeline 
network in Shelby County, TN, USA, a main water distribution network in Shelby County, TN, 
USA, and a simplified main water network in Sejong City, South Korea. The stand-alone 
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component utilities are computed by synthesizing the individual utilities of components in terms 
of each decision making criterion in the lower-scale decision making analysis. The stand-alone 
component utilities are then transformed into the CPIM component utilities by use of the CPIM 
equations of Eq. (5.8). Through the optimization techniques subject to a budget constraint (using 
IBM ILOG CPLEX
®
 as an optimization solver) and the iteration processes based on the 
analytical network reliability analyses, the preference list of component retrofitting is set. A 
hypothetical example is first considered to demonstrate the mechanism of the proposed approach. 
Three additional examples are then demonstrated to exemplify the efficacy and effectiveness of 
the proposed approach. For the simplicity sake, the stations are assumed to be unbreakable and 
pipelines alone are considered for the decision making analysis. The computational time costs 
reported hereinafter are based on the use of MATLAB®  on the personal computer: Intel Core 2 
DuoT6400 2.00GHz CPU and 4GB RAM 
5.5.1. Example 1: hypothetical network 
The hypothetical network example in Figure 5.4 is considered to show the mechanism of the 
proposed approach. The goal is to maximize the connectivity between nodes 1 and 4 under a 
scenario earthquake with a moment magnitude of Mw=7.0. The pipeline specifications, 
retrofitting costs and traffic congestion costs in Table 5.1 are intended for showing the 
mechanism of the new proposed approach more conspicuously. In the same context, the relative 
weights are assumed to be k1=0.17, k2=0.19, k3=0.36 and k4=0.28 among individual utility 
functions. 
Figure 5.5 shows the individual stand-alone component utilities for each decision making 
criterion: current component disconnection probability, component failure probability change 
after retrofitting, user traffic congestion cost, and agency retrofitting cost. Noting that the 
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decision making criteria are conflicting or trading-off one another, the individual stand-alone 
component utilities for each decision making criterion could be synthesized into the overall 
stand-alone component utilities in Figure 5.6 by use of the additive multi-criteria utility function 
of Eq. (5.7) as the component analysis.  
 
 
Figure 5.4     Hypothetical network example 
 
Table 5.1     Pipeline specifications for retrofitting (Example 1) 
Link ID Start Node End Node Length(ft) Congestion Period(day) Retrofitting Cost($k) 
5  1 2 9000 17 100 
6 2 3 15000 15 140 
7 2 3 9000 15 140 
8 3 4 6000 20 120 
9 3 4 15000 20 120 
10 3 4 12000 20 120 
 
In terms of the stand-alone component utility, the components are shown in order of  
8/9/10→6/7→5 from biggest to smallest, which means that components 8/9/10 have the biggest 
preferences for retrofitting from the component level perspective. However, from the network 
level perspective, the intuition is that the component 5 is the most important because there is no 
other alternative path if it is disconnected. In the same context, components 6/7 and 8/9/10 are 
intuitively found to be followed in order of component importance in the network. That is, the 
1 2 45
6
7
8
10
9 EQ3
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existing component level analysis without consideration of component connectivity could 
produce different results from the network level analysis. Figure 5.7 shows the selection 
processes of retrofitting components based on varying CPIM component utilities without a 
budgetary constraint. The preference list of components for retrofitting is finally set in order of 
5→6→8→9→7→10, which answers to the intuition. For illustration, see the step-by-step 
processes in Figure 5.7. As the first step (See Figure 5.7(a)), the CPIM component utilities are 
calculated from the CPIM-based network level analysis by taking the stand-alone component 
utilities as the judgmental component failure probabilities and the component 5 is selected for the 
retrofitting project with the first most preference (the first preference order is 5→8/9/10→6/7). 
Next, once the component 5 is retrofitted, the preference order is updated into 6/7→8/9/10 in 
Figure 5.7(b), and the component 6 or 7 (6 for the illustrative reason here) is selected for the next 
retrofitting project with the second most preference. For the next step in Figure 5.7(c), the 
preference order is now updated into 8/9/10→6 with the component 6 retrofitted, and the 
component 8, 9, or 10 (8 for the illustrative reason here) is selected for the next retrofitting 
project with the third most preference. For the following steps in Figure 5.7(d)-(f), components 9, 
7 and 10 are followed in order for retrofitting. However, if the problem is subject to a budgetary 
constraint, e.g., $340k, the preference list should be set to maximize the sum of CPIM 
component utilities within the budgetary bound. For this reason, a constraint binary integer 
optimization programming found in Figure 5.8 that the final preference order for retrofitting 
should be changed into 5→8→9 under the budgetary constraint. It is notable that components 8 
and 9 are selected due to the budgetary constraint even though they do not have the highest 
CPIM utilities in the respective steps. All of the procedures are completed in 0.806 second and 
the efficacy of the proposed approach is thus demonstrated. 
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Figure 5.5     Individual stand-alone component utilities in the component level analysis in terms 
of (a) component disconnection probability, (b) component failure probability   
change, (c) user traffic congestion cost, and (d) agency retrofitting cost 
 
 
Figure 5.6     Overall stand-alone component utilities in the component level analysis  
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(a) Step 1: Link 5 selected (b) Step 2: Link 6 selected 
 
(c) Step 3:  Link 8 selected (d) Step 2: Link 9 selected 
(e) Step 2: Link 7 selected (f) Step 2: Link 10 selected 
 
Figure 5.7     Selection processes of network component retrofitting based on varying CPIM 
component utilities without a budgetary constraint 
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(a) Step 1: Link 5 selected (b) Step 2: Link 8 selected 
(c) Step 3: Link 9 selected 
 
Figure 5.8     Selection processes of network component retrofitting based on varying CPIM 
component utilities with a budgetary constraint of $340k 
 
5.5.2. Example 2: simplified gas transmission network in Shelby County, TN, USA  
The simplified gas transmission network in Shelby County, TN, USA in Figure 5.9 is considered 
to demonstrate the efficacy and effectiveness of the new proposed approach as a real example. 
The goal is to maximize the connectivity between nodes 5 and 17 under a scenario earthquake 
with a moment magnitude of Mw=7.0 subject to a budgetary constraint of $296,119k (i.e., 61% of 
the total retrofitting cost). Based on pipeline specifications, retrofitting costs and traffic 
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congestion costs in Table 5.2, the individual stand-alone component utilities for each decision 
making criterion are calculated in Figure 5.10 and synthesized into the overall stand-alone 
component utilities in Figure 5.11 by use of the additive multi-criteria utility function of Eq. 
(5.7), assuming that the relative weights among individual utility functions are k1=0.40, k2=0.30, 
k3=0.10 and k4=0.20. Finally, by converting the stand-alone component utilities into the CPIM 
component utilities and using the constraint optimization and iteration processes based on the 
analytical network reliability analysis methods, the preference list of components for retrofitting 
could be set in order of 19→25→35→30→37→23→20→21→36→27→33→32. Figure 5.14 
shows the step-by-step selection processes of retrofitting components and the conspicuous re-
retrofitting effects in the multi-criteria decision making analysis of network components. The 
computational time for the analysis is 6.801 seconds and the efficacy of the proposed approach is 
demonstrated in the real example. 
 
 
Figure 5.9     Simplified gas transmission network in Shelby County, TN (Same as Figure 3.4) 
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Table 5.2   Pipeline specifications for retrofitting (Example 2) 
Link ID Start Node End Node Length(ft) Congestion Period(day) Retrofitting Cost($k) 
18   1   4   9,000   96  24,140  
19   1   6 15,000 160  40,234  
20   1 10   9,000   93  24,140  
21   2   6   6,000   62  16,093  
22   2 14 15,000 162  40,234  
23   3 11 12,000 128  32,187  
24   3 12   6,000   63  16,093  
25   6   5   9,000   98  24,140  
26   6 11 18,000 191  48,280  
27   7 12   6,000   67  16,093  
28   8   9   6,000   62  16,093  
29   9 16   6,000   65  16,093  
30 11   5 18,000 190  48,280  
31 12 13   6,000   70  16,093  
32 14   7   6,000   68  16,093  
33 14   8   6,000   62  16,093  
34 14 15   9,000   95  24,140  
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Figure 5.10   Individual stand-alone component utilities in the component level analysis in terms 
of (a) component disconnection probability, (b) component failure probability 
change, (c) user traffic congestion cost, and (d) agency retrofitting cost 
 
 
Figure 5.11   Overall stand-alone component utilities in the component level analysis 
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(a) Step 1: Link 19 selected  (b) Step 2: Link 25 selected 
 
(c) Step 3:  Link 35 selected  (d) Step 4: Link 30 selected 
 (e) Step 5: Link 37 selected  (f) Step 6: Link 23 selected 
 
Figure 5.12   Selection processes of network component retrofitting based on varying CPIM 
 component utilities with a budgetary constraint of $296,119k 
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(g) Step 7: Link 20 selected 
 
(h) Step 8: Link 21 selected 
 
(i) Step 9:  Link 36 selected 
 
(j) Step 10: Link 27 selected 
 
(k) Step 11: Link 33 selected 
 
(l) Step 12: Link 32 selected 
 
Figure 5.12 (cont.) 
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5.5.3. Example 3: simplified water distribution network in Shelby County, TN, USA  
 
 
Figure 5.13   Simplified water distribution network in Shelby County, TN (Same as Figure 3.5) 
 
The simplified water distribution network in Shelby County, TN, USA in Figure 5.13 is also 
selected from Chapter 3 to demonstrate the efficacy and efficiency of the proposed approach as a 
real example. The goal is to maximize the connectivity between nodes 28 and 50 under a 
scenario earthquake with a moment magnitude of Mw=7.7 subject to a budgetary constrain of 
$12,840,000k (i.e., 20% of the total retrofitting cost). Based on the CPIM component utilities 
calculated from pipeline specifications, retrofitting costs and traffic congestion costs in Table 5.3 
by use of the same assumptions as Example 2, and using the constraint optimization and iteration 
processes based on the analytical network reliability analysis methods, the preference list of 
components for retrofitting could be set in order of 116→92→84→112→78→95→94→55→ 
113→79→97→71→87→98→82→56. The analysis is conducted with a bound width of 1% 
between the upper and lower bounds of the network connectivity and its computation time 
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increases to 301 seconds due to the network size increase. However, it should be noted that the 
same results could be also produced just in 2.909 seconds only with only a small portion of the 
disjoint link set (e.g., 5 sets among 718 disjoint link sets needed for the 1% bound width). It 
results from the finding that the CPIM is not so sensitive to the bound width and that it is more 
conspicuous in the link-set-based CPIM calculation rather than the cut-set-based CPIM 
calculation. Thus, it can be claimed that the final check could be conducted with a narrower 
bound after a rough prioritization list is suggested by the decision-making analyses with many 
what-if scenarios for wider bound widths. 
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Table 5.3   Pipeline specifications for retrofitting (Example 3) 
Link ID Start Node End Node Length(ft) Congestion Period(day) Retrofitting Cost($k) 
51 1 4 397,377  4,039  1,065,860  
52 4 1 397,377   4,039  1,065,860  
53 1 16 397,036 4,036 1,064,946 
54 1 17 383,045 3,901 1,027,419 
55 2 7 269,071 2,737   721,713 
56 2 41 273,166 2,777   732,697 
57 2 46 267,024 2,723   716,222 
58 3 44 319,916 3,258   858,091 
59 3 48 324,011 3,300   869,075 
60 3 49 301,148 3,069   807,751 
61 4 19 397,377 4,040 1,065,860 
62 4 20 393,282 3,998 1,054,877 
63 5 15 329,812 3,358   884,635 
64 5 43 311,044 3,160   834,295 
65 5 44 335,272 3,409   899,280 
66 5 48 335,272 3,415   899,280 
67 6 23 384,751 3,910 1,031,995 
68 6 26 358,817 3,651   962,433 
69 7 40 285,110 2,903   764,733 
70 7 42 285,110 2,905   764,733 
71 7 45 306,266 3,112   821,479 
72 8 17 383,045 3,898 1,027,419 
73 8 18 378,950 3,853 1,016,435 
74 9 27 352,334 3,583   945,044 
75 9 30 349,262 3,550   936,805 
76 10 34 311,726 3,175   836,124 
77 10 35 306,608 3,124   822,396 
78 10 36 306,608 3,119   822,396 
79 11 30 321,281 3,272   861,753 
80 11 32 322,987 3,285   866,329 
81 12 33 302,172 3,079   810,498 
82 12 34 311,726 3,174   836,124 
83 13 14 275,896 2,804   740,019 
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Table 5.3 (cont.) 
Link ID Start Node End Node Length(ft) Congestion Period(day) Retrofitting Cost($k) 
84 13 38 289,887 2,951   777,547 
85 14 39 297,394 3,025   797,682 
86 15 31 345,509 3,516   926,738 
87 15 35 318,210 3,239   853,516 
88 15 42 301,148 3,060   807,751 
89 16 8 395,329 4,021 1,060,367 
90 17 18 374,173 3,804 1,003,622 
91 20 21 401,813 4,088 1,077,759 
92 20 23 396,353 4,030 1,063,114 
93 20 25 393,282 4,001 1,054,877 
94 21 22 402,154 4,089 1,078,674 
95 23 22 396,353 4,034 1,063,114 
96 23 24 390,552 3,969 1,047,554 
97 25 24 387,481 3,945 1,039,317 
98 26 27 360,864 3,667   967,924 
99 26 29 349,945 3,559   938,636 
100 27 28 368,030 3,743   987,145 
101 29 32 322,987 3,291   866,329 
102 30 29 349,945 3,564   938,636 
103 31 9 352,334 3,582   945,044 
104 32 33 306,949 3,128   823,311 
105 34 11 321,281 3,271   861,753 
106 35 9 318,210 3,237   853,516 
107 35 11 321,281 3,266   861,753 
108 36 12 302,172 3,075   810,498 
109 37 36 305,243 3,105   818,735 
110 37 38 288,863 2,936   774,800 
111 38 12 289,887 2,947   777,547 
112 38 39 289,887 2,947   777,547 
113 40 10 285,792 2,905   766,563 
114 40 37 285,792 2,905   766,563 
115 41 13 269,754 2,745   723,545 
116 41 40 273,166 2,784   732,697 
117 42 10 306,608 3,116   822,396 
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Table 5.3 (cont.) 
Link ID Start Node End Node Length(ft) Congestion Period(day) Retrofitting Cost($k) 
118 43 15 329,812 3,355   884,635 
119 44 45 319,916 3,257   858,091 
120 45 43 311,044 3,168   834,295 
121 48 47 335,954 3,414   901,109 
122 49 45 306,266 3,121   821,479 
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5.5.4. Example 4: simplified main water network in Sejong, Korea  
 
Figure 5.14    Simplified main water network example of Sejong City, Korea (Same as Figure 
4.11 except that the ID’s of the selected components are presented) 
 
The simplified main water network in Sejong, Korea in Figure 5.14 is also selected from Chapter 
4 to demonstrate the efficacy and efficiency of the proposed approach as a real example. The 
goal is to maximize the connectivity between nodes 16 and 46 under a scenario earthquake with 
a moment magnitude of Mw=7.0 subject to a budgetary constrain of $45,286k (i.e., 5% of the 
total retrofitting cost). Based on the CPIM component utilities calculated from pipeline 
specifications, retrofitting costs and traffic congestion costs in Table 5.4 by use of the same 
assumptions as Example 2, and using the constraint optimization and iteration processes based 
on the analytical network reliability analysis methods, the preference list of components for 
retrofitting could be set in order of 141→144→155→139→147→150→140→156→102→151 
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→98→142. The analysis is conducted with a bound width of 1% between the upper and lower 
bounds of the network connectivity and its computation time amounts to as many as 4,070 
seconds. Even though the computational time is greatly shorter than widely used non-sampling 
based techniques like MCS, it is notable that the computation time significantly increases 
compared to the other examples. It is because the example uses the clustering-based multi-scale 
network reliability method of Chapter 4 to compute the connectivity between source and 
terminal nodes and thus needs a considerable amount of time to calculate the correlation between 
(super-)components (which represent the identified clusters) even on the assumption of no 
correlation between components. However, it should be also noted that the same preference list 
could be produced just in 5.398 seconds when the correlation between (super-) components is 
disregarded in the computation process for an approximate analysis, which means that the 
prioritization list is not sensitive to the correlation between (super-)components. Even though the 
results may be different from the strict solution, it could be very beneficial in conducting the 
decision-making analysis with many what-if scenarios. Thus, it can be claimed that the final 
check could be conducted by use of the strict approach after using the approximate approach 
with many what-if scenarios in the initial phase of decision making. 
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Table 5.4   Pipeline specifications for retrofitting (Example 4) 
Link ID Start Node End Node Length(ft) Congestion Period(day) Retrofitting Cost($k) 
60 1 3       3,488           45       9,354  
61 2 4       2,694           34       7,225  
62 13 12       2,090           25       5,606  
63 11 8       2,657           30       7,128  
64 10 9       2,234           32       5,993  
65 1 2       3,829           41     10,270  
66 3 4       4,629           51     12,417  
67 8 9       2,388           25       6,406  
68 11 10       2,464           28       6,609  
69 3 18       5,705           67     15,303  
70 3 16       4,049           50     10,859  
71 4 17       4,265           49     11,440  
72 16 17       4,580           56     12,285  
73 18 16       4,754           49     12,751  
74 19 16       4,980           56     13,358  
75 18 19       6,804           71     18,251  
76 17 14       3,241           35       8,694  
77 19 14       5,892           64     15,805  
78 14 5       7,559           83     20,275  
79 5 20       4,852           58     13,015  
80 20 19       6,549           75     17,565  
81 6 14       7,405           85     19,862  
82 7 6       3,530           45       9,469  
83 7 5       5,551           61     14,890  
84 8 15       6,234           73     16,720  
85 9 22      10,394         112     27,878  
86 15 22       5,702           59     15,294  
87 21 15       4,396           51     11,792  
88 21 24       3,688           43       9,891  
89 23 24       3,366           42       9,029  
90 24 25       3,228           37       8,659  
91 25 26       3,068           32       8,228  
92 7 26       3,409           43       9,143  
93 1 40       3,825           43     10,261  
94 41 40       2,546           31       6,829  
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Table 5.4(cont.) 
Link ID Start Node End Node Length(ft) Congestion Period(day) Retrofitting Cost($k) 
95 2 41       1,864           21       4,998  
96 40 38       3,425           36       9,187  
97 41 39       2,008           20       5,386  
98 39 38       1,690           25       4,532  
99 38 37       4,849           53     13,006  
100 39 36       3,560           39       9,548  
101 36 13       3,740           47     10,032  
102 36 37       1,220           19       3,274  
103 11 32       2,920           38       7,832  
104 32 30       2,402           28       6,442  
105 30 34       3,146           39       8,439  
106 34 27       1,611           20       4,321  
107 27 12       2,822           37       7,568  
108 10 31       3,865           43     10,366  
109 31 29       2,667           37       7,154  
110 29 33       3,986           46     10,692  
111 33 28       2,297           32       6,160  
112 28 35       3,196           35       8,571  
113 31 32       1,772           21       4,752  
114 29 30       1,985           21       5,324  
115 33 34       1,765           21       4,734  
116 28 27       2,001           21       5,368  
117 35 12       2,395           27       6,424  
118 42 34       2,690           36       7,216  
119 42 32       4,049           43     10,859  
120 15 45       2,411           27       6,468  
121 23 22       5,354           61     14,362  
122 45 22       3,678           46       9,865  
123 23 44       2,434           26       6,530  
124 44 25       1,883           22       5,051  
125 26 44       4,357           50     11,686  
126 43 2       2,881           33       7,726  
127 43 36       4,078           49     10,938  
128 42 12       5,597           62     15,013  
129 21 46       3,245           39       8,703  
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Table 5.4 (cont.) 
Link ID Start Node End Node Length(ft) Congestion Period(day) Retrofitting Cost($k) 
130 46 23       3,671           45       9,847  
131 46 22       3,934           49     10,551  
132 47 13       3,894           45     10,446  
133 48 17       2,405           25       6,450  
134 48 49       2,982           39       7,999  
135 14 49       2,090           27       5,606  
136 4 50       2,123           23       5,694  
137 50 48       4,180           50     11,211  
138 15 46       4,839           53     12,980  
139 21 54         922           17       2,473  
140 24 51       1,266           17       3,397  
141 25 52       1,020           16       2,737  
142 26 53       1,529           19       4,101  
143 53 52       3,068           32       8,228  
144 52 51       2,700           33       7,242  
145 54 51       3,615           46       9,698  
146 55 37       2,995           32       8,034  
147 55 13       1,168           17       3,133  
148 55 35       3,593           46       9,636  
149 57 56       2,785           31       7,471  
150 36 56       1,171           12       3,142  
151 57 13       1,703           19       4,567  
152 39 43       2,041           25       5,474  
153 6 5       2,208           25       5,922  
154 42 30       1,969           21       5,280  
155 58 11       1,240           15       3,326  
156 58 59       1,263           22       3,388  
157 59 32       1,788           20       4,796  
158 20 7      10,367         108     27,808  
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5.6. Summary 
In this chapter, a new multi-scale multi-criteria decision making approach for lifeline network 
retrofitting is developed using the multi-criteria utility theory and analytical network reliability 
methods. For this purpose, the lower-scale decision making analysis is conducted to synthesize 
the conflicting decision making criteria into a “stand-alone” component utilities in the 
component level by using the multi-criteria utility theory. The computed “stand-alone” 
component utilities are then converted into the CPIM (Component Probability based Importance 
Measure) component utilities with consideration of the component’s connectivity or importance 
in the network topology by using the advance analytical network reliability methods like the 
selective RDA of Chapter 3 and the clustering-based network reliability analysis method of 
Chapter 4. A set of candidates are selected to maximize the sum of CPIM component utilities 
under a budgetary constraint by a constraint binary integer optimization programming and the 
only project with the highest CPIM utility value among them is selected for the retrofit project. 
By assuming the selected component is retrofitted, the CPIM component utilities are re-
calculated and another component is selected among a new set of candidates considering re-
retrofitting effects in a network. This process is repeated until the available budget is exhausted. 
The efficacy and effectiveness of the proposed multi-scale multi-criteria decision making 
approach are demonstrated by a hypothetical example and three additional real examples. The 
proposed approach shows a consistent result with the intuition, which reflects the network 
mechanism in the hypothetical example. The three other real examples also show that the 
decision making could be conducted effectively by handling the major technical challenges using  
the systematic approach. The efficiency of the developed approach is also demonstrated by 
achieving the rapid computation without compromising the accuracy. The relative importance 
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order of components are not sensitive to the  width between upper and lower bounds of system 
utility and the correlation between (super-) components, which helps keep the proposed approach 
efficient.    
The proposed multi-scale multi-criteria decision making approach establishes a 
systematic decision making framework for lifeline network decision making problems. It is also 
a very effective and efficient tool by helping overcome the computational challenges of network 
problems thanks to the computational merits of analytical network reliability analysis methods. It 
will thus help emergency mangers and urban engineers to allocate limited budgets in the most 
efficient and effective way. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
In this chapter, the developed approaches for rapid network reliability analysis and decision 
making are summarized and the major findings are explored. Finally, the future research topics 
are discussed.  
6.1. Summary 
The goal of this thesis is to develop system reliability analysis and decision making methods for 
rapid network risk assessment and decision support. As the first step, an efficient risk assessment 
framework for large-size lifeline networks is developed with consideration of both inter-event 
and intra-event uncertainties in spatially correlated ground motions. The proposed framework 
consists of three main tasks: 1) component reliability analysis, 2) system reliability analysis, and 
3) calculation of component importance measures. A lower-scale analysis approach is 
systemized to compute the component reliability analysis by discretizing a line-type component 
and applying reliability analysis techniques. Subsequently, two analytical network reliability 
approaches are proposed for the efficient system reliability analysis approach -- the “selective” 
Recursive Decomposition Algorithm (RDA) and the clustering-based multi-scale network 
reliability analysis.  
In order to calculate the probabilities of network disconnection events, the “selective” 
Recursive Decomposition Algorithm (RDA) achieves faster convergence of the bounds on 
network disconnection probabilities with a significantly reduced number of identified sets by 
identifying critical disjoint cut sets and link sets preferentially by use of the most reliable path 
algorithm and a selective graph decomposition scheme. It improves efficiency of risk assessment 
128 
 
of complex lifeline networks characterized by a large number of components, complex network 
topology, and statistical dependence between network component failures.  
Even though the selective RDA is faster than any other existing analytical algorithms, it 
still inherits the intrinsic limitation of the original RDA in that the computational cost may 
increase exponentially with the network size. Thus, a new clustering-based multi-scale network 
reliability analysis approach is developed to overcome the computational challenges in terms of 
the network size. The approach identifies an adequate number of clusters by use of spectral 
clustering algorithms and represents the clusters with representative super-links. By use of the 
selective RDA, the failure probabilities of the super-links and the statistical dependence between 
the failures of components and super-components are evaluated. If the simplified network 
containing these super-links is still exceedingly large for the selective RDA to handle, additional 
levels of hierarchical clustering are introduced. By use of the proposed approach, any sizable 
network problem can be solved without significantly compromising the accuracy.  
Finally, in order to help emergency managers and urban engineers make a reasonable 
decision making in allocating limited budgets, a multi-scale multi-criteria decision making 
analysis approach is developed by incorporating the component-level multi-criteria utility theory 
and the network component importance measure based on the above-mentioned analytical 
network reliability approaches. A lower-scale decision making analysis is conducted to 
synthesize the conflicting decision making criteria into a “stand-alone” component utilities in the 
component level by using the multi-criteria utility theory. The computed “stand-alone” 
component utilities are then converted into the CPIM (Component Probability based Importance 
Measure) component utilities with consideration of the component’s connectivity or importance 
in the network topology by using the advance analytical network reliability methods. A set of 
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candidates are selected to maximize the sum of CPIM component utilities under a budgetary 
constraint by a constraint binary integer optimization programming and the only project with the 
highest CPIM utility value among them is selected for the retrofit project. With the updated 
information of the retrofitting component, the process is iterated until the available budget is 
exhausted. The proposed approach establishes a systematic decision making framework for 
lifeline network decision making problems and is also a very effective and efficient tool by 
helping overcome computational challenges due to the merits of analytical network reliability 
analysis methods. 
In summary, the developed approaches contribute to the rapid network reliability analysis 
and decision making and allow the emergency mangers and urban engineers to exercise effective 
hazard-mitigation planning and prompt-but-prudent post-disaster responses using the rapid 
network reliability analysis methods and allocate the limited budgets in the more efficient and 
effective way using the systematic multi-scale multi-criteria decision making framework. 
 
6.2. Major Findings 
This thesis has focused on development of efficient and effective system reliability analysis 
methods for complicated large-size lifeline networks and the risk-based decision making analysis 
based on the use of the developed analytical methods. The major findings are summarized as 
follows: 
 Compared with the simulation-based network reliability analysis methods, the developed 
risk assessment framework significantly improves the computational speed and widens 
the application scope towards other probabilistic measures such as component importance 
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measures by using analytical approaches. These benefits are achieved without 
compromising accuracy while inter- and intra-event uncertainties of spatially correlated 
ground motions are incorporated into the framework. It is also found that the impact of 
spatial correlation is significant in the network reliability analysis, but hard to predict 
because the impact depends on the particular earthquake scenario and the network 
topology. This means that the spatial correlation should be properly accounted for during  
the network reliability analysis. 
  The selective RDA improves efficiency of risk assessment of complex lifeline networks 
characterized by a large number of components, complex network topology, and 
statistical dependence between network component failures. The algorithm identifies 
critical disjoint cut sets and link sets preferentially by use of the most reliable path 
algorithm and a selective graph decomposition algorithm and consequently achieves 
faster convergence of the bounds on network disconnection probabilities. On top of it, the 
computational efficiency of the selective RDA is not influenced by component 
numbering choice while the impact on the efficiency of the original RDA is not 
significant and unpredictable. 
 The improvement in the computational efficiency of the selective RDA becomes more 
conspicuous as the network size increases because the computational costs of RDA 
approaches tend to increase exponentially with the number of network components. 
However, the selective RDA inherits the intrinsic limitation of the original RDA in that 
the computational cost may increase exponentially with the network size. This 
computational challenge is overcome by the clustering-based multi-scale approach. 
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 The clustering-based multi-scale approach overcomes computational challenges in 
seismic risk analysis of a large and complex network by achieving great improvement in 
computational efficiency without compromising accuracy. For a large network, the 
computational time can be further decreased by using the hierarchical clustering approach. 
Besides, the hierarchical clustering approach also further improves the efficiency in 
computing the conditional probability importance measures (CPIM).   
 In the multi-scale multi-criteria decision making approach, the conflicting decision 
making criteria are synthesized into a “stand-alone” utility by the multi-criteria utility 
theory. The connectivity and relative importance of components are also considered by 
converting the “stand alone” utility into the CPIM utility. Besides, the computational time 
could be significantly reduced without compromising the accuracy by using the 
developed analytical network reliability approaches: selective RDA and clustering-based 
multi-scale approach. It is also found that the relative importance order of components 
are not sensitive to the width between upper and lower bounds of system utility and the 
correlation between (super-)components, which helps keep the proposed approach 
efficient.    
 
6.3. Future Research Topics 
The proposed approaches in this thesis still have several limitations in meeting the real world 
needs in practice and should be further developed to improve their applicability to complicated 
network systems in the world. The following research topics should thus be considered for future 
research. 
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 Develop a selective Recursive Decomposition Algorithm (RDA) with consideration of 
other network metrics such as flow capacity and path speed. In this thesis, the selective 
RDA is developed to evaluate only the connectivity probability between a pair of nodes. 
The applicability should be widened by considering the other network metrics. For 
example, traffic flow capacity of large networks might be easily calculated by the RDA.  
By developing the selective RDA for other network metrics, the application of other 
developed approaches in this study could also be widened to apply it to them.  
 Develop a selective Recursive Decomposition Algorithm (RDA) for the network of 
components with multiple damage states. In the thesis, the selective RDA is developed 
for a network of components with a binary state, i.e., failed or survived. However, in 
reality, the component damage states are continuous and need to be represented with 
multiple damage states.  It could be also applied to the other developed approaches in this 
study. By combining the selective RDA for multiple damage states and other network 
metrics, the network reliability analyses for the network metrics such as traffic flow and 
path speed could be conducted. 
 Increase the accuracy of the network representation for the identified clusters in the 
clustering-based multi-scale network reliability analysis. In this thesis, the identified 
clusters are approximately represented by several super-links between inter-cluster nodes 
with considerable accuracy. However, as the order of multi-scales increases by use of the 
hierarchical clustering technique, the errors could be accumulated in the process. Thus, 
an exact representation method needs to develop.   
 Develop a metric to represent the whole network functionality. In this thesis, only a 
network disconnection probability between a pair of nodes is considered in the network 
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reliability and/or decision making analyses. However, in reality, the whole network 
functionality may be more interesting for emergency managers and urban planners. Given 
the whole network functionality metric, the similar framework for network reliability and 
decision-making analyses could be applied. 
 Develop an analytical or rapid solution to compute the correlation coefficient between 
two standard normal random variables given the disjoint cut or link sets. In this thesis, the 
correlation coefficient could be computed numerically based on a multi-normal 
probability calculation equation of Eq. (2.9) proposed by Ditlevsen and Madsen (1996). It 
consumed a significant portion of the computational time in the network reliability 
analysis approaches. Especially, most of the computational time is for this correlation 
coefficient calculation in the clustering-based multi-scale network reliability analysis. 
 Apply the multi-scale multi-criteria decision making for retrofitting prioritization of 
lifeline networks to other applications. The framework is developed to introduce the 
methodology for network-level decision making and we are living in the environment, 
consisting of networked infrastructures. The framework could be used to detect important 
components in the inter-connected network, e.g., an interconnected network of electricity   
and waterline with consideration of qualitative as well as quantitative characteristics. 
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